Dec. 31 (Bloomberg) — Until last year, people in the Ethiopian settlement of Elliah earned a living by farming their land and fishing. Now, they are employees.

Dozens of women and children pack dirt into bags for palm seedlings along the banks of the Baro River, seedlings whose oil will be exported to India and China. They work for Bangalore- based Karuturi Global Ltd., which is leasing 300,000 hectares (741,000 acres) of local land, an area larger than Luxembourg.

The jobs pay less than the World Bank’s $1.25-per-day poverty threshold, even as the project has the potential to enrich international investors with annual earnings that the company expects to exceed $100 million by 2013.

“My business is the third wave of outsourcing,” Sai Ramakrishna Karuturi, the 44-year-old managing director of Karuturi Global, said at the company’s dusty office in the western town of Gambella. “Everyone is investing in China for manufacturing; everyone is investing in India for services. Everybody needs to invest in Africa for food.”

Companies and governments are buying or leasing African land after cereals prices almost tripled in the three years ended April 2008. Ghana, Madagascar, Mali and Ethiopia alone have approved 1.4 million hectares of land allocations to foreign investors since 2004, according to the International Institute for Environment and Development in London.

Emergent Asset Management Ltd.’s African Agricultural Land Fund opened last year. On Nov. 23, Moscow-based Pharos Financial Advisors Ltd. and Dubai-based Miro Asset Management Ltd. announced the creation of a $350 million private equity fund to invest in agriculture in developing countries.

‘Last Frontier’

“African agricultural land is cheap relative to similar land elsewhere; it is probably the last frontier,” said Paul Christie, marketing director at Emergent Asset Management in London. The hedge fund manager has farm holdings in South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

“I am amazed it has taken this long for people to realize the opportunities of investing in African agriculture,” Christie said.

Monsoon Capital of Bethesda, Maryland, and Boston-based Sandstone Capital are among the shareholders of Karuturi Global, Karuturi said. The company is also the world’s largest producer of roses, with flower farms in India, Kenya and Ethiopia.

One advantage to starting a plantation 50 kilometers (31 miles) from the border with war-torn Southern Sudan and a four- day drive to the nearest port: The land is free. Under the agreement with Ethiopia’s government, Karuturi pays no rent for the land for the first six years. After that, it will pay 15 birr (U.S. $1.18) per hectare per year for the next 84 years.

More Elsewhere

Land of similar quality in Malaysia and Indonesia would cost about $350 per hectare per year, and tracts of that size aren’t available in Karuturi Global’s native India, Karuturi said.

Labor costs of less than $50 a month per worker and duty- free treaties with China and India also attracted Karuturi Global, he said. The $100 million projected annual profit will come from the export of food crops, including corn, rice and palm oil, he said. The company also is plowing land on a 10,900- hectare spread near the central Ethiopian town of Bako.

The project will give the government revenue from corporate income taxes and from future leases, as well as from job creation, said Omod Obang Olom, president of Ethiopia’s Gambella region and an ally of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s ruling party.

“This strategy will build up capitalism,” he said in an interview in Gambella. “The message I want to convey is there is room for any investor. We have very fertile land, there is good labor here, we can support them.” The government plans to allot 3 million hectares, or about 4 percent of its arable land, to foreign investors over the next three years.

Surprised Workers

Workers in Elliah say they weren’t consulted on the deal to lease land around the village, and that not much of the money is trickling down.

At a Karuturi site 20 kilometers from Elliah, more than a dozen tractors clear newly burned savannah for a corn crop to be planted in June. Omeud Obank, 50, guards the site 24 hours a day, six days a week. The job helps support his family of 10 on a salary of 600 birr per month, more than the 450 birr he earned monthly as a soldier in the Ethiopian army.

Obank said it isn’t enough to adequately feed and clothe his family.

“These Indians do not have any humanity,” he said, speaking of his employers. “Just because we are poor it doesn’t make us less human.”

One Meal

Obang Moe, a 13-year-old who earns 10 birr per day working part-time in a nursery with 105,000 palm seedlings, calls her work “a tough job.” While the cash income supplements her family’s income from their corn plot, she said that many days they still only have enough food for one meal.

The fact that the project is based on a wage level below the World Bank’s poverty limit is “quite remarkable,” said Lorenzo Cotula, a researcher with the London-based IIED.

Large-scale export-oriented plantations may keep farmers from accessing productive resources in countries such as Ethiopia, where 13.7 million people depend on foreign food aid, according to a June report by Olivier De Schutter, the United Nations special rapporteur on the right to food. It called for ensuring that revenue from land contracts be “sufficient to procure food in volumes equivalent to those which are produced for exports.”

Karuturi said his company pays its workers at least Ethiopia’s minimum wage of 8 birr, and abides by Ethiopia’s labor and environmental laws.

‘Easily Exploitable’

“We have to be very, very cognizant of the fact that we are dealing with people who are easily exploitable,” he said, adding that the company will create up to 20,000 jobs and has plans to build a hospital, a cinema, a school and a day-care center in the settlement. “We’re going to have a very healthy township that we will build. We are creating jobs where there were none.”     The project may help cover part of the $44 billion a year that the UN Food and Agriculture Organization says must be invested in agriculture in poor nations to halve the number of the world’s hungry people by 2015.

“We keep saying the big problem is, you need investment in African agriculture; well here are a load of guys who for whatever reason want to invest,” David Hallam, deputy director of the FAO’s trade and markets division, said in an interview in Rome. “So the question is, is it possible to sort of steer it toward forms of investment that are going to be beneficial?”

Buntin Buli, a 21-year-old supervisor at the nursery who earns 600 birr a month, said he hopes Karuturi will use some of its earnings to improve working conditions and provide housing and food.      “Otherwise we would have been better off working on our own lands,” he said. “This is a society that has been very primitive. We want development.”

To contact the reporter on this story: Jason McLure in Addis Ababa via the Johannesburg bureau at abolleurs@bloomberg.net.

However, critics warned the “Copenhagen Accord”, the result of two weeks of negotiations in the Danish capital, was full of holes and lacked a timetable – and environment agencies branded it toothless and a failure. One African delegation likened the deal to the Holocaust.

An exhausted Gordon Brown, who arrived back in Britain at 3am on Saturday, admitted that much more had to be done to achieve a legally binding, properly funded agreement.

A new United Nations-backed conference could be held in Mexico in the first half of 2010, several months earlier than planned, sources suggested.

However, he added: “This cannot be the end. In fact, it is only the beginning and we must go further still.”

Other sources close to the talks blamed the Chinese government for obstructing progress throughout – while countries from Central and South America, including Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Bolivia, opposed the Copenhagen Accord as “undemocratic”.

The accord, led by the US, China, Brazil, India and South Africa and worked up by a total of 30 nations, including Britain, had no reference to a legally binding agreement.

It recognised a need to limit global temperatures to no more than 2C above “pre-industrial levels” and set a “goal” for developed countries to raise $100 billion a year for poorer nations by 2020.

Emerging nations are now to monitor their own efforts on climate change and report to the UN every two years, while there was no detailed framework on controversial carbon markets.

The agreement also included a method for verifying industrialised nations’ reduction of emissions after China, on US insistence, dropped its resistance to this measure.

The Tyrant Betrayer , Meles Zenawi, Put His Security Guard as Climate Negotiator
Watche Both Videos

Ban Ki-moon, the UN Secretary-General, said: “It may not be everything we hoped for, but this decision of the Conference of Parties is an essential beginning. We must transform this into a legally binding treaty next year.”

Mr Miliband admitted: “We recognise there could have been more ambition in parts of this agreement. Therefore we have got to drive forward as hard as we can towards both a legally binding treaty and that ambition.

“I wish there had been a timetable. But what became clear in the negotiations was that developing countries didn’t want to sign up to legally binding targets.

“A lot of procedural arguments that were going on were fundamentally about this issue of legally binding targets.”

British government sources insisted “no deal whatsoever” was on the table by the time Mr Brown arrived in Copenhagen on Thursday. The Prime Minister played a key role “knocking heads together” among world leaders, they said.

American officials, meanwhile, claimed President Barack Obama played a key role in pulling the talks back from the brink of total collapse – in particular by standing up to the Chinese over the make-or-break issue of transparency.

Lumumba Stanislaus Di-Aping, the Sudanese negotiator, said the accord spelt “incineration” for Africa and compared it to the Nazis sending “6 million people into furnaces” in the Holocaust.

Andy Atkins, executive director of Friends of the Earth, said: “This toothless declaration that the US is spinning as a success is a sham – this agreement won’t stop a two degree rise in temperature and, as it stands, condemns millions of the world’s poorest people to hunger, suffering and loss of life as climate change accelerates.

“We need a profound change of approach from the world’s wealthiest countries to secure a genuine, strong and fair agreement.”

Martin Rees, president of the Royal Society, said: “As a global community, we now move one step closer to a humanitarian crisis, where those least able to adapt will be worst affected. It is essential that world leaders put aside their differences and come together once again, make the difficult choices and commit to taking effective action with firm and binding targets.”

Robert Bailey, of Oxfam International, said: “It is too late to save the summit, but it is not too late to save the planet and its people. We have no choice but to forge forward towards a legally binding deal in 2010. This must be a rapid, decisive and ambitious movement, not business as usual.”

Last night, in his weekly podcast, the Prime Minister claimed the Copenhagen Accord was “a breakthrough never seen on this scale before”.

As Britain and the US both tried to claim credit for reaching any form of agreement at Copenhagen, the blame game for the overall failure began. Ed Miliband, the Climate Change Secretary, said that “developing countries didn’t want to sign up to legally binding targets”.

(New York) – The Yemeni government should stop systematically arresting Ethiopian asylum seekers and forcibly returning them to Ethiopia, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today. Human Rights Watch also called on the United Nations refugee agency to do more to press the Yemeni government to meet its obligations toward all asylum seekers and refugees.

 The 53-page report, “Hostile Shores: Abuse and Refoulement of Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Yemen,” details the harrowing sea crossing from Africa that tens of thousands make each year to reach Yemen’s shores. But for many that is only the beginning of their ordeal. Yemen welcomes arriving Somalis, but Ethiopians and others risk being arrested and illegally forced to return home, possibly to face persecution. The government views Somalis as refugees with protected status, but it views Ethiopians and others as illegal migrants, to be automatically deported. The report also shows that the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has not done nearly enough to press the Yemeni government to change its abusive policies against Ethiopian asylum seekers.
“Illegal immigration is a big problem for Yemen’s government, but hunting asylum seekers down like criminals and sending them back illegally is no way to solve the problem,” said Georgette Gagnon, Africa director at Human Rights Watch. “The Yemeni government needs to respect their basic right to seek asylum.”

More than 100,000 people – almost all of them from Somalia and Ethiopia – have arrived by boat along Yemen’s coast during the past two years. Most are fleeing war or persecution at home or are in search of work. Smugglers take them by boat from either the Somali port city of Bosasso or the town of Obock in Djibouti. Conditions aboard the boats are inhumane and the smugglers – especially those operating out of Bosasso – often treat their passengers with astonishing brutality, robbing, beating, and even murdering them.

Smugglers order passengers on the overcrowded boats not to move, even to stretch cramped limbs, which is impossible since the journey from Bosasso normally lasts one to three days. They routinely beat their passengers with whips and sticks. Many suffer far worse. Human Rights Watch documented cases of passengers being murdered and thrown overboard and of women being sexually assaulted and raped on board the overcrowded boats while other passengers looked on helplessly. Others suffocate, locked into cramped and airless spaces below deck as punishment or simply as a way of cramming more people on board. Hundreds of people die every year during the crossings.

For many, the worst danger lies when the boats are finally in sight of Yemen. Many smugglers, to minimize their own risk of capture, force their passengers to leap into deep water and swim, beating or even stabbing them if they try to refuse. Many, not knowing how to swim or simply too exhausted from their ordeal on the boats, drown within sight of shore. Human Rights Watch interviewed people who watched other passengers – in some cases even their own children -drown less than 200 meters from land.

Those who reach Yemen face one of two very different receptions, depending not on why they have come but on where they come from. The Yemeni government recognizes all Somali nationals as prima facie refugees, meaning that they are automatically entitled to all the protections of refugee status. But for Ethiopians and other non-Somalis the reverse is true; the Yemeni government treats all of them as illegal immigrants, even if they face a serious risk of persecution in the countries they fled.

Ethiopians and other non-Somalis must keep to the shadows to avoid capture by the security forces. Those who are caught are generally imprisoned and put on a fast track toward deportation, with no meaningful opportunity to claim asylum. The security forces have even arrested asylum seekers at the UNHCR-run Kharaz refugee camp, in one case removing more than 50 Ethiopians after detaining them in UNHCR’s own compound overnight.
No one knows exactly how many asylum seekers have been arrested and deported in this manner. Neither UNHCR nor anyone else has regular access to people in immigration detention. Ethiopian embassy officials in the Yemeni capital, Sana’a, interview people awaiting deportation to Ethiopia, and there are disturbing indications that those officials have coerced asylum seekers into agreeing to return back home.

The Ethiopian asylum seekers who manage to negotiate the obstacles in their path and reach a UNHCR office without being arrested are able to apply for refugee status. If UNHCR recognizes them as refugees the government will not arrest and deport them. But they still face discriminatory government policies that relegate them to a kind of second-tier refugee status.
The Yemeni government will not issue official identification documents to non-Somali refugees, preventing them from claiming rights and services to which they should be entitled. Ethiopian refugees also suffer harassment and violence, fueled in part by the perception that the government will not protect them. In many cases, Yemeni police officers have refused to investigate or arrest Yemenis responsible for serious crimes against Ethiopian refugees. Human Rights Watch documented numerous cases of assault, sexual harassment, and even murder of Ethiopian refugees that went unpunished.

UNHCR has an enormous and complicated job in Yemen, and there are serious practical limits to its ability to influence Yemeni government policy, Human Rights Watch said. But the refugee agency has not been forceful enough in pressuring the Yemeni authorities to protect the rights of non-Somali refugees and asylum seekers.
UNHCR has repeatedly met with Yemeni government officials behind closed doors, but this strategy has failed to deliver results, and the agency has been unwilling to express public concern about the government’s actions. The report calls on UNHCR to speak out publicly about Yemeni government abuses where necessary and to press more forcefully for access to potential asylum seekers in detention.

International law prohibits refoulement, or the return of refugees to countries where they face a serious risk of persecution. Yemen is the only country on the Arabian Peninsula to have ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention, which requires asylum seekers and refugees to be accorded rights without discrimination on the basis of their national origin.
“UNHCR’s strategy of quiet diplomacy with the Yemeni government simply isn’t working,” Gagnon said. “The agency needs to start treating the plight of Ethiopian asylum seekers and refugees in Yemen as a priority and not a secondary concern.”

Quotes from Asylum Seekers and Refugees Interviewed by Human Rights Watch in Yemen:
If there are 100 boats, maybe the people from only two or three will say there was no problem. Every boat has stories more difficult than the last one. You will meet one person and think, this is terrible. Then you meet the next boat, and you will hear something you cannot even imagine. You feel heartache. 

-Humanitarian worker at a reception center for arrivals on the southern coast of Yemen.
When we were on the sea, she was sitting near the driver. They wanted to rape the girl. When I heard her scream I stood up, but they beat me with a stick on my neck. They played with her. They raped her. They did what they wanted. And when they raped my sister, they kicked her. I saw her; she was crying. But no one talked. If a person talked, they would kick him or throw him to the sea.

-Young man who witnessed his sister being raped on board a boat from Bosasso to Yemen.
They caught my little girl and dropped her into the sea. She was three years old. I fought with the man, and he hit me with a stick and I lost some of my teeth. After that they started pushing all of us into the sea. They dropped all of my children into the sea – five of them. The three-year-old girl died. She drowned. One almost died because she swallowed a lot of water, but I rescued her and took her to the hospital in Mayfa’a where she stayed for 20 days. She is six years old.

-Somali refugee describing what happened when smugglers forced his family and other passengers to leave the boats in deep water far from shore.

Many of our people come to Yemen because of their political problems, and they suffer many more problems at the beach. Other refugees – the Somalis – they accept them and take them to the [Kharaz refugee] camp, but we are directly captured and deported to the country which we escaped from…if we try to come to UNHCR, we are treated badly at every [police] checkpoint. Some, by going a long trip and hiding themselves along the way, arrive in Sana’a. But many are captured first.

Must Read Report by Human Rights Watch: Click Here to Read

While the bigger industrialized nations have wrangled over cutting CO2 emissions, smaller states have attempted to make their mark at Copenhagen. Ethiopia is hoping to export renewable energy, South Korea has founded a Global Green Growth Institute and even Bangladesh has set ambitious targets.

By Christian Schwägerl in Copenhagen (edited)

While Ethiopian activists protested outside the conference center against human rights abuses, inside Tyrant Meles Zenawi was bluffing Tigrai like  ecological revolution. “We will soon reach a goal of 100 percent renewable energy like in Tigrai and then we want to start exporting the electricity,” he said.

In the future cars would be powered by fuel derived from the Jatropha plant, and he would ensure that billions of trees were planted. “We are embarking on a carbon neutral path,” Tyrant Zenawi said. His audience was stunned because  according to the World Resources Institute, Zenawi’s Ethiopiay emitted 73 million tons of CO2 in 2005, that is about one ton per capita. In contrast the US emitted 6.9 billion tons, or 23.5 tons per person.

Tyrant Zenawis bluff was a desperate attempt to create an environmentally friendly image, while human rights activists have condemned his crimes against humanity and genocide.

‘The Era of Blind Growth Must End’

South Korea is particularly active. The country has experienced a rapid industrialization in only a few decades. The South Koreans used canapés and “traditional biscuits” to entice people to several shows at the conference. Climate-change ambassador Rae-Kwon Chung is regarded as a pioneer of the new doctrine of “green economic growth.” “So far, our economy had a false basis, the era of blind growth must end,” he said.

To South Korea, CO2 reduction is not a burden but a “business model.” The government has proudly announced that 2 percent of GDP will be spent on the green revolution in the future. President Lee Myung-bak announced on Thursday that $10 million (€6.9 million) would be used to establish a Global Green Growth Institute, which brings economists and top researchers together to develop new ideas. “We want to see our citizens driving fewer cars and our products saving energy,” the climate-change ambassador said. “We all have to completely change our lifestyles and return to the old values of a simple life.”

Spending Scarce Resources on Cutting Emissions

However, the concrete aims are somewhat more modest: 11 percent renewables by 2030, and a 4 percent reduction in emissions compared to those of 2005. According to the OECD, South Korea’s emissions are the fastest growing of all industrialized states. There remains much to be done as Rae-Kwon Chung heads back to South Korea.

Not far from the South Korean event, Bangladesh was singing its own praise for progress on a completely different front. “We have to save our citizens from climate change,” said Environment Minister Hasan Mahmud. The country is desperately poor, with an average daily income of just $3. And yet the government feels obliged to spend hundreds of millions of dollars this year to help the country adjust to the affects of climate change. In particular it has to ensure that people are protected from the many floods that have hit this low-lying country criss-crossed by rivers.

Mahmud announced at Copenhagen that the government also intends to spend scarce resources on reducing CO2 emissions. The average Bangladeshi emits just 0.9 tonnes a year. That is nothing compared with the emissions in Europe, the US and China. If these big polluters don’t manage to commit to ambitious targets at the UN summit, than the announcement by Bangladesh’s environment minister will remain one of the bitterest memories of the Copenhagen conference.

GENEVA (Reuters) – More than 74,000 Africans fled to Yemen this year, a 50 percent increase over 2008 despite instability in the country, according to figures issued on Friday by the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.

Upheaval and economic strains in the Horn of Africa fueled a rise in migrants paying smugglers and undertaking the hazardous sea crossing, said UNHCR spokesman Andrej Mahecic.

“In some cases they are beaten, raped, killed or just thrown overboard into shark-infested waters,” he said, describing the routes across the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea as “the busiest and the deadliest one in the world.”

Many Africans make the dangerous journey to Yemen in the hope of finding jobs in Saudi Arabia or further afield.

Yemen, which is fighting a Shi’ite rebellion in the north and separatist unrest in the south, said its security forces backed by warplanes killed up to 30 al Qaeda militants on Thursday. A security source said the operations had foiled a planned series of suicide bombings.

Unlike in previous years, Somalis did not account for the majority of people arriving in Yemen in 2009, despite fighting around their capital Mogadishu. A total of 32,800 entered Yemen this year.

More than 42,000 Ethiopians, twice the number recorded in 2008, traveled to Yemen but most went on to the Gulf states in search of jobs, Mahecic said.

Somalis are automatically granted refugee status on arrival in Yemen but people from other countries including Ethiopia must have their status as refugees determined before they can apply for asylum.

“The vast majority of Ethiopians did not approach the (UNHCR) reception centres as they had no intent to seek asylum,” Mahecic said. “However, we believe that some of them may have avoided approaching the centres, fearing arrest and detention.”

A five-year-old drought which continued in 2009 has caused widespread hunger in Ethiopia, which has a population of 83 million, along with other East African countries [ID:nLM526117]

At least 309 people drowned or were killed during their sea voyage from the Horn of Africa this year, down from 590 last year, although the UNHCR said final figures on people who went missing in 2009 were not yet available.

(Editing by Stephanie Nebehay)

Tyrant Zenawi: ‘Because we have more to lose, we should compromise and be flexible with other countries.’ Credit: Servaas van den Bosch/IPS

COPENHAGEN, Dec 17 (IPS) – Ethiopian Tyrant  Meles Zenawi says Africa must compromise and be flexible towards other countries, if the U.N. Climate Conference ending on Dec. 18, is to reach an agreement.

Speaking to the press in the Danish capital, Tyrant Zenawi – ostensibly leading the African front on climate change – said the continent would suffer the most should the world fail to seal a deal.

“Because we have more to lose, we should compromise and be flexible with (other countries),” said Zenawi, after admitting that his proposals at the U.N. summit fall short of African expectations.

But he was quick to point out that Africa’s bending did not mean desperation: “We will not accept any empty words”.

Millions of Africans are banking their hopes on the Ethiopian Tyrant, who was chosen to lead the African delegation during the High Level Meeting of heads of state that concludes the U.N. Climate Conference.

The prize is to bring home a sound deal that will act to slow the rising average temperatures that have caused catastrophic droughts and severe rains in recent years, and to secure funding from the historically-polluting countries to cope with changes that are already unvaoidable.

While maintaining that Africa had virtually no responsibility for the greenhouse gas emissions causing climate change, Tyrant Zenawi slashed the 67 billion dollars a year that African leaders agreed to demand from the industrialised nations who are responsible.

Instead his proposal accepts the developed world’s offer of a start-up fund of $10 billion a year for Africa over the next three years, with the future to be decided on later. This fund will be dedicated to adaptation and mitigation actions, including the fight against deforestation, in poor countries.

“I support that the fund be established through the creation of a tax on international financial transactions, and that other sources be considered, such as taxes on sea freight or air transport,” he said. “I also support that it should be administered through the African Development Bank.”

In the long term, Tyrant Zenawi proposed that funding rise to $50 billion a year in 2013, and reach $100 billion by 2020 – a proposal perfectly in line with what U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton outlined in a press conference on Dec. 17.

His proposal touched a raw nerve among African civil society organisations, who have demanded that he resign as coordinator of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change.

The proposal has caused outrage in Africa, according to Pan-African Climate Justice spokesperson Mithika Mwenda. He accuses Tyrant Zenawi of caving in to the dictates of industrialised nations, leaving Africans to fend for themselves as best they can

“His statement is undermining the bold positions of African negotiators and ministers represented in Copenhagen, and threatens the very future of Africa,” said an angry Mwenda.

The proposed $10 billion a year for Africa is an insult, said Mwenda, who did a quick calculation and came up with $4 a year for each African. In his view, it should be the size of the pocket, that determines the expected contribution from industrialised countries. They are, he said “paying their debt for polluting the earth”.

A difficult start for Africa in the final phase of negotiations. The collective front put up by Africa Group negotiators as part of the Group of 77 and China block had failed to convince the Rich World to either commit to substantial greenhouse gas emissions or the $200 billion a year the developed world will need to cope with floods, droughts, rising sea levels and the spread of diseases due to climate change.

But the bloc had at least made it clear that the developing world would not stand peacefully by any abandoning of Kyoto Protocol commitments to reduce emissions, or easily settle for a modest though immediate sum.

Zenawi’s break with this position to endorse a Western position is a worrying sign that this solidarity amongst the countries whose people will bear the full weight of climatic changes may not hold firm.

On December 13-15, 2009, it will be six years since the massacre of 424 Anuak in Gambella, Ethiopia followed by nearly two more years of widespread extrajudicial killings, rape, torture, imprisonment, disappearances and destruction. By the end of this time, another 1500 Anuak from this very tiny ethnic group, numbering less than 100,000 worldwide and less than .01% of the Ethiopian population, were killed.

In April of 2009, Genocide Watch president, Dr. Gregory Stanton, defined this ethnically-based targeting of the Anuak as genocide and crimes against humanity in his referral of the “case of Ethiopia” to the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights.

Wondering what thoughts were on the minds of the Anuak in Gambella at this anniversary of their darkest of days or what changes they might have seen during these years, we in the Anuak Justice Council contacted some of the Anuak to ask this question. One Anuak man said, “Thank you for asking me what has changed in the six years. The answer is not a lot. We still do not know where the bones of our people are, not one single killer has been brought to justice and we still are not free.”

As some might remember, the genocide was linked to gaining access to oil on Anuak land. Drilling for that oil began almost simultaneously to the massacre. There was a prepared list of those to be targeted for death by Meles’ Ethiopian National Defense Forces. Those who were on that list were mostly those who had been the most outspoken opponents to the TPLF government control of every aspect and benefit of this effort, in violation of the Ethiopian constitution which provided regional involvement in such endeavors. International laws also protected the land rights of indigenous people.

The two wells that were drilled proved to be dry; however, the memory of the horror and the impact of the great loss of beloved family and community members continue to be felt throughout the Anuak community in Ethiopia and worldwide. Another Anuak man commented in his interview:

“To some who are outside Gambella, today [December 13th] is the day of remembering, but for those of us here, every day is a ‘remembering day;’ we remember by not seeing our neighbors, by seeing someone who lost her husband or her son, by seeing a child without a father or by seeing a demolished home, burned down six years ago, but still not rebuilt. The list could go on and on. That is the reason that to us, each day is a day of remembrance.”

For now, in Gambella, there will be no commemorative services, public recognition of the past, acknowledgement by the government of what they have done or new efforts to hold offenders accountable.

One Anuak woman explains a very different—and difficult—reality for Anuak:

“The horror of December 13th is part of our daily life—like a dark cloud hanging over us that has never left. What makes it worse is that the killers are still around us. For example, the chief of police who ordered the killing of the Anuak in 2003, Haile Selassie Tadesse, has been promoted to a higher position. He is now the information desk officer for the regional governor, Omot Obang Olam. (Governor Omot is the one who allegedly compiled the list of Anuak to be targeted for death. Last year, he was denied entrance into Canada based on his complicity in committing crimes against humanity.) How can we say there is a change with this kind of thing going on around us?”

Instead, life in Gambella is expected to go on as if nothing ever happened. The government, who authorized the targeting of the Anuak and continues to give both impunity and rewards to the perpetrators, is still in power and they “dislike” any “remembering.” It is “not good” for their public image. Instead they promote propaganda regarding progress in the country that the people of Gambella have yet to see.

One Anuak man commented on this:

“The government in Addis can preach with their rhetoric that there is peace, development, democracy, the rule of law, good government and justice, but the truth is opposite from what they are saying. As it is said in the Bible, the truth can set you free. It is a light that can never be hidden.”

The unhidden truth being revealed right now are the new government plans to again attempt to exploit the significant natural resources and related economic opportunity in the region. The Meles government has leased a large tract of some of the most fertile land in the region to Mohammed Al Amoudi, an Ethiopian/Saudi Arabian billionaire, who has, according to reports, already been “given” a choice parcel for next to nothing. He is negotiating for more land, saying he wants some 500,000 hectares in Gambella and in the neighboring Benishangul-Gumuz region and in the Amhara region. Al Amoudi has also procured the gold mining rights to extract gold from indigenous Anuak land, a source of income for the Anuak for many years. They will now be totally left out of any of the benefits.

Meles is also making more bargain land deals with India, Saudi Arabia, China and others from 35-year to up to 99-year leases. It is very clear that the TPLF-dominated government does not want the people, but only our resources. As indigenous agricultural land is confiscated, much of the food produced on these lands will be directed to other countries or the local people may end up buying food grown on their land, at inflated prices, from foreigners and made into slave laborers.

This is going on all over the country. In Gambella, it has raised an uproar of outrage among the Anuak. One Anuak man interviewed said: “To make the matter worse, Meles is still planning more “indirect” killings that could result in even more lives being lost than were lost in 2003. Meles is now giving away our land to foreigners. This land is covered with virgin forests. The forests to us are our food, our shelter, our nails, our roof, our walls and our medication. The land is not just “nobody’s land” as Meles claims, it is our life! Without this forest, we could have never existed as a people. Meles is really going to the hard extreme and I do not think we will accept it without resisting.”

Another Anuak man stated:

“The central government has been bribed by foreign investors and now the regional governor, Omot Obang Olam, is being bribed to give away this land. The Anuak elders are warning him not to gamble with our lives; meaning that our land is our life. These dirty business deals, conducted without consulting the people, are very dangerous. This Anuak land was given to us not by us begging for it or bribing someone, but because God gave it to us. Without it, there is no us. I hope the Meles regime and Omot Obang Olam will listen.”

A young Anuak man added his comments:

“In the Abobo area of Gambell, Al Amoudi has already cleared the land of the forests and still plans to transport some 300 tractors, bulldozers, or other large equipment to the area for further clearing of the land. The Anuak people who live there are already being forced from their land. No one knows who will take responsibility for these displaced people or where they should go. There seems to be no plan for them and they may end up not having any land to farm. The Anuak land is being given away to the Chinese, the Indians, the Saudi Arabians and the “so-called Ethiopian” al Amoudi.”

“If they continue with the plan as is, and destroy the forests, even a billion dollars or one hundred years will not restore them. Knowing that, some of us would choose to be cleared away with our forests. The indigenous people will lose their livelihood. We are not against feeding the Ethiopian people or in investing in their future, but investing in outsiders and feeding outsiders with the food from our land when Ethiopian people are starving does not make sense. It would never be tolerated even in those countries now wanting our land. If it is unacceptable for Ethiopians to go to China or India or Saudi Arabia and clear their land without consulting the people, it is unacceptable here. We are human too and we care about the future of our children like everyone else. We would rather remain the way we are or the way our ancestors were instead of losing our livelihood for the greedy few. My message to the investors is, listen to the owners of the land or you will pay the consequences.”

The Anuak will not ignore this attempt to defraud them of their land because the land is who they are. This land-grabbing is in violation of international law and their right to it is protected. This is a very sensitive issue and the Anuak and other Ethiopians throughout the world, are watching, waiting and preparing for what will come next.

In the meantime, on this anniversary of our pain, the Anuak will remember in silence, quietly meeting together or visiting the graves of those who died; that is, if their loved one’s body was ever recovered for many were buried in a mass grave; and some, simply disappeared. Many Anuak who ran to refugee camps in neighboring countries, will remember from there and Anuak in the Diaspora will hold commemorative services.

Since 2003, the Ethiopian government has only become more abusive, repressive and openly dictatorial as they continue to imprison, torture and kill people all across the country; as they close off any political space in anticipation of rigging the next election and as they deny Ethiopians every basic civil right. It is a morally bankrupt regime that will not willingly give up power unless the victims of their crimes, from every region of the country, rise up together to demand their freedom.

An Anuak woman eloquently spoke of her hope that Ethiopians would work together. She stated:

“What gives us hope and encouragement is when we hear that you in the Diaspora are working together with other Ethiopians. Let everybody work together to create that Ethiopia that will hold us together. As we remember this December 13th, let us remember December 13ths of other Ethiopians that have taken place all over Ethiopia.

As we remember the Anuak who have lost their family members or others who are locked up in prison, let us also remember all Ethiopians whose name or tribe we may not know, but who are part of us because we are all victims of this inhumane government. All of these prisoners are the warriors of justice, committed to bringing justice throughout Ethiopian land. I am confident that God will free these people from their cells so they will be able to rejoin their families. I am also confident that if we stand together, justice will pour over Ethiopia.”

Can we find justice for these and the many other precious lives lost at the hands of a government who has forgotten their role as protectors of the people? As one of the interviewees stated:

“This regime is one of the most hated regimes in Ethiopian history because they kill the people like they are nothing and with no remorse. As a result, even though the people may not talk about it, within themselves they are unified by the terror and horror inflicted on them and others by this government.” The testimonies given here are just a few, but if we were to go throughout Ethiopia, we would find testimonies like these in every region and among every ethnic group. If these kinds of testimonies cannot unify us as one, what will?

In conclusion, at the time of their crisis six years ago, the Anuak were alone, but today, they are reaching out for the hands of others. This is the time to reach back and clasp hands together—mourning together under one tent covering all of Ethiopia.

May God remind us that whoever is being killed or tortured anywhere in Ethiopia is a cause for our mourning. May God help us see a bigger picture of our shared humanity rather than the ethnicity that Meles uses to incite us to destroy each other. May God open the eyes of Ethiopians to know that whenever the blood of an Ethiopian is spilled, it is the blood of our brother or our sister.

December 13th is a tragic day, but do not forget, God is able to make all things—even those that are horribly evil–work together for good, according to His purposes. He can use all of us who are genuinely determined and committed to work together for something greater beyond only ourselves.

Could the loss of these precious lives create the foundation for a better future for our children and grandchildren? Yes, but only if we are transformed as people who are willing to define our destiny.

Could God bring about the compassion in each of us towards every ethnic group that might lift the pain from the shoulders of those suffering all over the country? Yes, if we soften our hearts.

The final question for us today is if we the people of Ethiopia are willing to become those “watchmen” who call on the LORD day and night, never being silent until God helps us bring justice, freedom, integrity and goodness to Ethiopia?

As the Anuak, the people of Gambella and all other peace-loving Ethiopians remember this day, let us give God “no rest” until He establishes a “New Ethiopia” in our hearts, in our minds and in our land.

For information, Please e-mail us: advocacy@anuakjustice.org

The United States of America today accused the Ethiopian government of favoring one ethnicity in appointing government positions. Mr. Douglas M. Griffiths, USA representative in the United Nations Human Rights Council, stated that: “Independent observers have noted…that most senior government positions are overwhelmingly represented by one ethnicity”, and recommended Ethiopia to examine and adjust the ethnic balance in government positions as the Ethiopian governments policy of Ethnic Federalism promotes. The Vatican also emphasized on the importance of a more equitable power sharing. Watch The Video (Use RealPlayer)

USA Mr. Douglas M. Griffiths English

Holy See (The Vatican) Mr. Hubertus Matheus Van Megen

Over 50 countries forwarded questions and recommendations to the government of Ethiopia in the Universal Periodic Review, the human rights exam of the United Nations, held in Geneva today.

In response to the American criticism the Head of the Ethiopian delegation, H.E. Mr. Fisseha Yimer, Special Adviser to the Minister at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, classified the accusation as “speculation”, “off the mark” and “wrong”. He promised the countries interested in this issue to come up with proof of the opposite.

Many participants asked questions about the infamous Charities and Societies Proclamation, The Mass Media Law and Anti terrorism Law, restrictive legislations, which are widely condemned by donors and international human rights groups.

In his introductory statement Mr. Yimer indicated that the Ethiopian population misunderstands international human rights norms, which makes it difficult for the government to implement international human rights standards in the Ethiopian society. This shows how the Ethiopian regime underestimates its own people. Knowing the amount of political prisoners, media repression and reports of violations of human rights at the moment, the Ethiopian delegation tried to cover up the dictatorial nature of the regime.

Answering questions from France on the 2005 election and its bloody aftermath, Mr. Yimer said that it was a past issue and that the outcome of the national inquiry was satisfactory. Many members of the opposition fled the country in 2005, including some members of the inquiry commission, after being harassed by Ethiopian government forces. Harassment on opposition and media freedom, raised by Australia, made Mr. Yimer laugh out loud and say: “There is no harassment!”.

Questions about the case of Birtukan Mideksa, the imprisoned leader of Ethiopia’s main opposition party, were completely ignored by the Ethiopian delegation.

Most of the countries asked access to detention centers and visits of special rapporteurs, individuals working on behalf of the United Nations who bear a specific mandate from the UN Human Rights Council, to investigate issues on arbitrary detention, extrajudicial executions, torture etcetera. In the past years, the Ethiopian government was requested to grant access to these special rapporteurs, requests which have not been granted so far. Mr.Yimer, the head of the delegation, answered saying this was not possible due to the limited capacity of the country.

The grave human rights violations committed by Ethiopian government military forces in the Somali region (Ogaden), described by Human Right Watch as genocide, were also raised by, mainly Western, countries. Mr.Yimer ignored answering these questions.

Unsurprisingly, countries benefiting from Ethiopia’s recourses, such as India and China, and most African countries, were mostly praising the Ethiopian regime for their achievements on the Millennium Development Goals and Social, Economic and Cultural Rights.

The Ethiopian delegation will present written answers to all the questions raised today, before the final report of the UPR will be adopted on Friday 11 december 2009.

Simon Norfolk for The New York Times

INDIAN-OWNED A rice and corn farm in Western Ethiopia. Here, a farmworker.

There are basically two ways to increase the supply of food: find new fields to plant or invent ways to multiply what existing ones yield. Zeigler runs the International Rice Research Institute, which is devoted to the latter course, employing science to expand the size of harvests. During the so-called Green Revolution of the 1960s, the institute’s laboratory developed “miracle rice,” a high-yielding strain that has been credited with saving millions of people from famine. Zeigler went to Saudi Arabia hoping that the wealthy kingdom might offer money for the basic research that leads to such technological breakthroughs. Instead, to his surprise, he discovered that the Saudis wanted to attack the problem from the opposite direction. They were looking for land.

In a series of meetings, Saudi government officials, bankers and agribusiness executives told an institute delegation led by Zeigler that they intended to spend billions of dollars to establish plantations to produce rice and other staple crops in African nations like Mali, Senegal, Sudan and Ethiopia. “They laid out this incredible plan,” Zeigler recalled. He was flabbergasted, not only by the scale of the projects but also by the audacity of their setting. Africa, the world’s most famished continent, can’t currently feed itself, let alone foreign markets.

The American scientist was catching a glimpse of an emerging test of the world’s food resources, one that has begun to take shape over the last year, largely outside the bounds of international scrutiny. A variety of factors — some transitory, like the spike in food prices, and others intractable, like global population growth and water scarcity — have created a market for farmland, as rich but resource-deprived nations in the Middle East, Asia and elsewhere seek to outsource their food production to places where fields are cheap and abundant. Because much of the world’s arable land is already in use — almost 90 percent, according to one estimate, if you take out forests and fragile ecosystems — the search has led to the countries least touched by development, in Africa. According to a recent study by the World Bank and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, one of the earth’s last large reserves of underused land is the billion-acre Guinea Savannah zone, a crescent-shaped swath that runs east across Africa all the way to Ethiopia, and southward to Congo and Angola.

Foreign investors — some of them representing governments, some of them private interests — are promising to construct infrastructure, bring new technologies, create jobs and boost the productivity of underused land so that it not only feeds overseas markets but also feeds more Africans. (More than a third of the continent’s population is malnourished.) They’ve found that impoverished governments are often only too welcoming, offering land at giveaway prices. A few transactions have received significant publicity, like Kenya’s deal to lease nearly 100,000 acres to the Qatari government in return for financing a new port, or South Korea’s agreement to develop almost 400 square miles in Tanzania. But many other land deals, of near-unprecedented size, have been sealed with little fanfare.

Investors who are taking part in the land rush say they are confronting a primal fear, a situation in which food is unavailable at any price. Over the 30 years between the mid-1970s and the middle of this decade, grain supplies soared and prices fell by about half, a steady trend that led many experts to believe that there was no limit to humanity’s capacity to feed itself. But in 2006, the situation reversed, in concert with a wider commodities boom. Food prices increased slightly that year, rose by a quarter in 2007 and skyrocketed in 2008. Surplus-producing countries like Argentina and Vietnam, worried about feeding their own populations, placed restrictions on exports. American consumers, if they noticed the food crisis at all, saw it in modestly inflated supermarket bills, especially for meat and dairy products. But to many countries — not just in the Middle East but also import-dependent nations like South Korea and Japan — the specter of hyperinflation and hoarding presented an existential threat.

When some governments stop exporting rice or wheat, it becomes a real, serious problem for people that don’t have full self-sufficiency,” said Al Arabi Mohammed Hamdi, an economic adviser to the Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development. Sitting in his office in Dubai, overlooking the cargo-laden wooden boats moored along the city’s creek, Hamdi told me his view, that the only way to assure food security is to control the means of production.

TILLABLE A new megafarm in Western Ethiopia, for palm-oil trees, sugar cane, rice and sesame.

Hamdi’s agency, which coordinates investments on behalf of 20 member states, has recently announced several projects, including a tentative $250 million joint venture with two private companies, which is slated to receive heavy subsidies from a Saudi program called the King Abdullah Initiative for Saudi Agricultural Investment Abroad. He said the main fields of investment for the project would most likely be Sudan and Ethiopia, countries with favorable climates that are situated just across the Red Sea. Hamdi waved a sheaf of memos that had just arrived on his desk, which he said were from another partner, Sheik Mansour Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, a billionaire member of the royal family of the emirate of Abu Dhabi, who has shown interest in acquiring land in Sudan and Eritrea. “There is no problem about money,” Hamdi said. “It’s about where and how.”

A long the dirt road that runs to Lake Ziway, a teardrop in the furrow of Ethiopia’s Great Rift Valley, farmers drove their donkey carts past a little orange-domed Orthodox church, and the tombs of their ancestors, decorated with vivid murals of horses and cattle. Between clusters of huts that looked as if they were constructed of matchsticks, there were wide-open wheat fields, where skinny young men were tilling the soil with wooden plows and teams of oxen. And then, nearing the lake, a fence appeared, closing off the countryside behind taut strings of barbed wire.

All through the Rift Valley region, my travel companion, an Ethiopian economist, had taken to pointing out all the new fence posts, standing naked and knobby like freshly cut saplings — mundane signifiers, he said, of the recent rush for Ethiopian land. In the old days, he told me, farmers rarely bothered with such formal lines of demarcation, but now the country’s earth is in demand. This fence, though, was different from the others — it stretched on for a mile or more. Behind it, we could glimpse a vast expanse of dark volcanic soil, recently turned over by tractors. “So,” said my guide, “this belongs to the sheik.”

He meant Sheik Mohammed Al Amoudi, a Saudi Arabia-based oil-and-construction billionaire who was born in Ethiopia and maintains a close relationship with the Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s autocratic regime. (Fear of both men led my guide to say he didn’t want to be identified by name.) Over time, Al Amoudi, one of the world’s 50 richest people, according to Forbes, has used his fortune and political ties to amass control over large portions of Ethiopia’s private sector, including mines, hotels and plantations on which he grows tea, coffee, rubber and japtropha, a plant that has enormous promise as a biofuel. Since the global price spike, he has been getting into the newly lucrative world food trade.

Ethiopia might seem an unlikely hotbed of agricultural investment. To most of the world, the country is defined by images of famine: about a million people died there during the drought of the mid-1980s, and today about four times that many depend on emergency food aid. But according to the World Bank, as much as three-quarters of Ethiopia’s arable land is not under cultivation, and agronomists say that with substantial capital expenditure, much of it could become bountiful. Since the world food crisis, Zenawi, a former Marxist rebel who has turned into a champion of private capital, has publicly said he is “very eager” to attract foreign farm investors by offering them what the government describes as “virgin land.” An Ethiopian agriculture ministry official recently told Reuters that he has identified more than seven million acres. The government plans to lease half of it before the next harvest, at the dirt-cheap annual rate of around 50 cents per acre. “We are associated with hunger, although we have enormous investment opportunities,” explained Abi Woldemeskel, director general of the Ethiopian Investment Agency. “So that negative perception has to be changed through promotion.”

The government’s pliant attitude, along with Ethiopia’s convenient location, has made it an ideal target for Middle Eastern investors like Mohammed Al Amoudi. Not long ago, a newly formed Al Amoudi company, Saudi Star Agricultural Development, announced its plans to obtain the rights to more than a million acres — a land mass the size of Delaware — in the apparent hope of capitalizing on the Saudi government’s initiative to subsidize overseas staple-crop production. At a pilot site in the west of the country, he’s already cultivating rice. Earlier this year, amid great fanfare marking the start of the program, Al Amoudi personally presented the first shipment from the farm to King Abdullah in Riyadh. Meanwhile, in the Rift Valley region, another subsidiary is starting to grow fruits and vegetables for export to the Persian Gulf.

Al Amoudi’s plans raise a recurring question surrounding investment in food production: who will reap the benefits? As we drove down to the waterside, through fields dotted with massive sycamores, a farm supervisor told me that the 2,000-acre enterprise currently produces food for the local market, but there were plans to irrigate with water from the lake, and to shift the focus to exports. In the distance, dozens of laborers were bent to the ground, planting corn and onions.

Later, when I asked a couple of workers how much they were paid, they said nine birr each day, or around 75 cents. It wasn’t much, but Al Amoudi’s defenders say that’s the going rate for farm labor in Ethiopia. They argue that his investments are creating jobs, improving the productivity of dormant land and bringing economic development to rural communities. “We have achieved what the government hasn’t done for how many years,” says Arega Worku, an Ethiopian who is an agriculture adviser to Al Amoudi. (Al Amoudi declined to be interviewed.) Ethiopian journalists and opposition figures, however, have questioned the economic benefits of the deals, as well as Al Amoudi’s cozy relationship with the ruling party.

By far the most powerful opposition, however, surrounds the issue of land rights — a problem of historic proportions in Ethiopia. Just down the road from the farm on Lake Ziway, I caught sight of a gray-bearded man wearing a weathered pinstripe blazer, who was crouched over a ditch, washing his shoes. I stopped to ask him about the fence, and before long, a large group of villagers gathered around to tell me a resentful story. Decades ago, they said, during the rule of a Communist dictatorship in Ethiopia, the land was confiscated from them. After that dictatorship was overthrown, Al Amoudi took over the farm in a government privatization deal, over the futile objections of the displaced locals. The billionaire might consider the land his, but the villagers had long memories, and they angrily maintained that they were its rightful owners.

Throughout Africa, the politics of land is linked to the grim reality of hunger. Famines, typically produced by some combination of weather, pestilence and bad governance, break out with merciless randomness, unleashing calamity and reshaping history. Every country has its unique dynamics. Unlike most African nations, Ethiopia was never colonized in the 19th century but instead was ruled by emperors, who granted feudal plantations to members of their royal courts. The last emperor, Haile Selassie, was brought down by a famine that fueled a popular uprising. His dispossessed subjects chanted the slogan “land to the tiller.” The succeeding Communist dictatorship, which took ownership of all land for itself and pursued a disastrous collectivization policy, was toppled in the aftermath of the droughts of the 1980s. Under the present regime, private ownership of land is still banned, and every farmer in Ethiopia, foreign and domestic, works his fields under a licensing arrangement with the government. This land-tenure policy has made it possible for a one-party state to hand over huge tracts to investors at nominal rents, in secrecy, without the bother of a condemnation process.

Ethiopia’s government denies that anyone is being displaced, saying that the land is unused — an assertion many experts doubt. “One thing that is very clear, that seems to have escaped the attention of most investors, is that this is not simply empty land,” says Michael Taylor, a policy specialist at the International Land Coalition. If land in Africa hasn’t been planted, he says, it’s probably for a reason. Maybe it’s used to graze livestock, or deliberately left fallow to prevent nutrient depletion and erosion.

There is an ongoing debate among experts about the extent of the global land-acquisition trend. By its nature the evidence is piecemeal and anecdotal, and many highly publicized investments have yet to actually materialize on the ground. The most serious attempt to quantify the land rush, spearheaded by the International Institute for Environment and Development, suggests that as of earlier this year, the Ethiopian government had approved deals totaling around 1.5 million acres, while the country’s investment agency reports that it has approved 815 foreign-financed agricultural projects since 2007, nearly doubling the number registered in the entire previous decade. But that’s far from a complete picture. While the details of a few arrangements have leaked out, like one Saudi consortium’s plans to spend $100 million to grow wheat, barley and rice, many others remain undisclosed, and Addis Ababa has been awash in rumors of Arab moneymen who supposedly rent planes, pick out fertile tracts and cut deals.

Of course, there have been scrambles for African land before. In the view of critics, the colonial legacy is what makes the large land deals so outrageous, and they warn of potentially calamitous consequences. “Wars have been fought over this,” says Devlin Kuyek, a researcher with Grain, an advocacy group that opposes large-scale agribusiness and has played a key role in bringing attention to what it calls the “global land grab.”

It wasn’t until Grain compiled a long list of such deals into a polemical report titled “Seized!” last October that experts really began to talk about a serious trend. Although deals were being brokered in disparate locales like Australia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Vietnam, the most controversial field of investment was clearly Africa. “When you started to get some hints about what was happening in these deals,” Kuyek says, “it was shocking.” Within a month, Grain’s warnings seemed to be vindicated when The Financial Times broke news that the South Korean conglomerate Daewoo Logistics had signed an agreement to take over about half of Madagascar’s arable land, paying nothing, with the intention of growing corn and palm oil for export. Popular protests broke out, helping to mobilize opposition to Madagascar’s already unpopular president, who was overthrown in a coup in March.

The episode illustrated the emotional volatility of the land issue and raised questions about the degree to which corrupt leaders might be profiting off the deals. Since then, there has been an international outcry. Legislators from the Philippines have called for an investigation into their government’s agreements with various investing nations, while Thailand’s leader has vowed to chase off any foreign land buyers.

But there’s more than one side to the argument. Development economists and African governments say that if a country like Ethiopia is ever going to feed itself, let alone wean itself from foreign aid, which totaled $2.4 billion in 2007, it will have to find some way of increasing the productivity of its agriculture. “We’ve been complaining for decades about the lack of investment in African agriculture,” says David Hallam, a trade expert at the Food and Agriculture Organization. Last fall, Paul Collier of Oxford University, an influential voice on issues of world poverty, published a provocative article in Foreign Affairs in which he argued that a “middle- and upper-class love affair with peasant agriculture” has clouded the African development debate with “romanticism.” Approvingly citing the example of Brazil — where masses of indigenous landholders were displaced in favor of large-scale farms — Collier concluded that “to ignore commercial agriculture as a force for rural development and enhanced food supply is surely ideological.”

In Ethiopia, Mohammed Al Amoudi and other foreign agricultural investors are putting Collier’s theory into practice. Near the southern town of Awassa, in a shadow of a soaring Rift Valley escarpment, sits a field of waving corn and a complex of domed greenhouses, looking pristine and alien against the natural backdrop. On an overcast July morning, dozens of laborers were at work preparing the ground for one of Al Amoudi’s latest enterprises: a commercial vegetable farm.

“For a grower, this is heaven on earth,” says Jan Prins, managing director of the subsidiary company that is running the venture for Al Amoudi. Originally from the Netherlands, Prins says he assumed that Ethiopia was arid but was surprised to learn when he came to the country that much of it was fertile, with diverse microclimates. The Awassa farm is one of four that Prins is getting up and running. Using computerized irrigation systems, the farms will grow tomatoes, peppers, broccoli, melons and other fresh produce, the vast majority of it to be shipped to Saudi Arabia and Dubai. Over time, he says, he hopes to expand into growing other crops, like wheat and barley, the latter of which can be used to feed camels.

The nations of the Persian Gulf are likely to see their populations increase by half by 2030, and already import 60 percent of their food. Self-sufficiency isn’t a viable option, as the Saudis have learned through bitter experience. In the 1970s, worries about the stability of the global food supply inspired the Saudi government to grow wheat through intensive irrigation. Between 1980 and 1999, according to a study by Elie Elhadj, a banker and historian, the Saudis pumped 300 billion cubic meters of water into their desert. By the early 1990s, the kingdom had managed to become the world’s sixth-largest wheat exporter. But then its leaders started paying attention to the warnings of environmentalists, who pointed out that irrigation was draining a nonreplenishable supply of underground freshwater. Saudi Arabia now plans to phase out wheat production by 2016, which is one reason it’s looking to other countries to fill its food needs.

“The rules of the game have changed,” says Saad Al Swatt, the chief executive of the Tabuk Agricultural Development Company, one of the kingdom’s largest farming concerns. Al Swatt’s company was one of those that met with Robert Zeigler about farming rice; he says that with government encouragement, he is looking at expanding into countries like Sudan, Ethiopia and Vietnam. “They have the land, they have the water, but unfortunately, they don’t have the system or sometimes the finance to have these large-scale agricultural projects.” Al Swatt says. “We wanted to export our experience and really develop those areas, to help people.”

About 10 percent of the more than 80 million people who live in Ethiopia suffer from chronic food shortages. This year, because of poor rains, the U.N. World Food Program warns that much of East Africa faces the threat of a famine, potentially the worst in almost two decades. Traditionally, the model for feeding the hungry in Africa has involved shipping in surpluses from the rest of the world in times of emergency, but governments that are trying to attract investment say that the new farms could provide a lasting, noncharitable solution. (“It’s better than begging,” one Ethiopian official recently told the African publication Business Daily.) Whatever the long-term justification, however, it looks bad politically for countries like Kenya and Ethiopia to be letting foreign investors use their land at a time when their people face the specter of mass starvation. And many experts wonder whether such governments will go through with the deals. Ethiopia, after all, was one of the countries that banned grain exports during the recent spike in world food prices. “The idea that one country would go to another country,” says Robert Zeigler, “and lease some land, and expect that the rice produced there would be made available to them if there’s a food crisis in that host country, is ludicrous.”

The hyperinflationary spiral that caused the world food crisis had multiple causes. The harvests in 2006 and 2007 were the worst of the decade, hedge funds and other players in the commodities markets appear to have driven up prices and government subsidies for biofuels encouraged farmers to grow crops that ended up as ethanol. But the environment and demography are more lasting issues, and experts predict that prices, which have declined since their peak, are likely to stabilize significantly above precrisis levels. This represents a danger to the developing world, where the poor spend between 50 and 80 percent of their income on food, but it may also present an opportunity. If one good thing has emerged from the crisis, it’s a growing awareness of Africa’s unrealized agricultural potential. Because where there are appetites, there are profits to be made.

In late June, several hundred farmers and investment bankers came together in Manhattan to survey the landscape at a conference on global agriculture investment. The food crisis has served as a catalyst for the sleepy agricultural sector, spurring financial firms like Goldman Sachs and BlackRock to invest hundreds of millions of dollars in overseas agricultural projects, so the mood was heady for business, though depressing for humanity. There much talk of Thomas Malthus, the 19th-century prophet of overpopulation and famine.

“Beware of 2020 and beyond, because we think there could be genuine food shortages by that period,” Susan Payne, the chief executive of Emergent Asset Management, told the audience during a talk on Africa’s agricultural potential. She showed a series of slides citing chilling statistics: grain stocks are at their lowest levels in 60 years; there were food riots in 15 countries in 2008; global warming is turning arable land into desert; freshwater is dwindling and China is draining its reserves; and the really big problem that contributes to all the others — the world’s population is growing by 80 million hungry people a year. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization estimates that in order to feed the world’s projected population in 2050 — some nine billion people — agricultural production needs to increase by an annual average of 1 percent. That means adding around 23 million tons of cereals to the world’s food supply next year, a little less than the total production of Australia in 2008.

“Africa is the final frontier,” Payne told me after the conference. “It’s the one continent that remains relatively unexploited.” Emergent’s African Agricultural Land Fund, started last year, is investing several hundred million dollars into commercial farms around the continent. Africa may be known for decrepit infrastructure and corrupt governments — problems that are being steadily alleviated, Payne argues — but land and labor come so cheaply there that she calculates the risks are worthwhile.

The payoffs could be immense. In a country like Ethiopia, farmers put in backbreaking effort, but they yield about a third as much wheat per acre as do Europe, China or Chile. Even modest interventions could start to close this gap. One small example: the black soil I saw throughout the Great Rift region. Known as vertisol, it’s a product of volcanic activity and possesses the nutrients to produce enormous harvests. Because of its high clay content, however, it becomes sticky and waterlogged during the rainy season, which makes it very difficult to plow by traditional methods. With the addition of advanced implements, improved seeds and fertilizer, you can double the amount of wheat it yields. Ethiopia, like all of Africa, is full of such opportunities, which is one reason the World Bank says that investing in agriculture is one of the most effective ways to speed economic development on the continent.

Yet agriculture has historically been a tiny item in foreign-aid budgets. For years, governments, private foundations and donor institutions like the World Bank have been urging African governments to fill the spending gap with private investment. Now, at the very moment a world food crisis has come along, creating the perhaps fleeting possibility of an influx of capital into African agriculture, some of the same organizations are sending conflicting messages. The Food and Agriculture Organization, for instance, co-sponsored a report calling for a major expansion of commercial agriculture in Africa, but the organization’s director-general has simultaneously been warning of the “neocolonial” dangers of land deals. “We’re making them feel that it’s sinful,” says Mafa Chipeta, a Malawian who oversees Ethiopia and the rest of eastern Africa for the organization. “Why are we not saying, here is an opportunity?”

One focus of agricultural investment in Ethiopia is the region of Gambella, near the border with Sudan. The World Bank says it has more than four million acres of irrigable land. “It’s emerald green, the whole place is fertile and they have only 200,000 people down there,” says Sai Ramakrishna Karuturi, head of an Indian commercial farming company. Earlier this year, Karuturi signed an agreement with the government to lease close to 800,000 acres on which he will grow rice, wheat and sugar cane, among other crops. Karuturi told me he doesn’t have to export the food to make money; there’s plenty of profit potential in the East African market. He has flown in John Deere tractors, agricultural experts from Texas A&M and commercial farmers from Mississippi to help him get things going. He says he’s raising $100 million in capital from private equity firms for the first phase of the project, which he estimates will ultimately cost well over a billion dollars. “Recently, I saw a lot of articles . . . where they referred to me as a food pirate,” Karuturi says. “This whole thing is so elitist, it’s ridiculous. They want Africa to remain poor.”

But the argument against enormous land concessions needn’t be based solely on appeals to human rights, environmental warnings or romanticism. It’s possible to be a believer in development without endorsing Paul Collier’s view that the small landholders stand in its way. In fact, there’s a whole school of economic thought that says that Collier is wrong, that big is not necessarily better in agriculture — and that the land deals therefore might be unwise not because they’re wrong but because they’re unprofitable. A recent World Bank study found that large-scale export agriculture in Africa has succeeded only with plantation crops like sugar and tea or in ventures that were propped up by extreme government subsidies, during colonialism or during the apartheid era in South Africa.

This record of failure is one reason that the government of Qatar, in addressing its food-security concerns, has chosen to concentrate on investing in existing agribusinesses rather than just acquiring land. That’s just one of many ways to invest in farming without removing the African farmers. On a bright Rift Valley afternoon, I went to see another option, a cooperative scheme under which a group of around 300 Ethiopians, working plots of 4 to 10 acres, were getting into export agriculture. During the European winter, they grew green beans for the Dutch market. The rest of the year, they cultivated corn and other crops for local consumption. The land had been irrigated with the help of a nonprofit organization and an Ethiopian commercial farmer named Tsegaye Abebe, who brought all the produce to market.

As a breeze riffled through a tall field of corn, a group of farmers, wearing sandals made from old tires, told me the arrangement, while not perfect, was beneficial in the most crucial respect: they weren’t toiling for someone else. Not far away, a Pakistani investor had taken over a government cattle ranch, once an area free for grazing, and had put fences and trenches in place to keep out the local livestock. The Ethiopians who worked there were miserable.

The farmers had heard rumors that foreign investors were eyeing still more Ethiopian land. Imam Gemedo Tilago, a 78-year-old cloaked in a white cotton shawl, shook his finger, vowing that Allah would not allow the community to remain passive. But that was a problem for the future, and the farmers had more grounded concerns. I noticed, driving down the rural paths that led to this farm, that the earth looked parched in places, and the cattle were showing their ribs through their dull brown hides. The worried farmers told me that this year, the seasonal rains were late in coming to the Rift Valley. If they didn’t arrive soon, there’d be hunger.

Source: The New York Times

Andrew Rice is a contributing writer and the author of “The Teeth May Smile But the Heart Does Not Forget,” about a Ugandan murder trial.

Dying crops are giving greater urgency to Ethiopia’s battle to make its people less vulnerable to hunger – 25 years after the 1984 famine that killed an estimated one million people.

But the current food crisis – that Ethiopia shares with other countries in the region – also risks diverting attention and resources from protecting farming families against potential disaster.

«It is God who has been feeding us all this time» Yangago Bunja

In two of the 12 districts of this part of southern Ethiopia, the authorities say there has been a complete failure of the latest maize crop.

They say other districts are relatively better off at the moment – but Wolayta has a population of about 1.6 million so any shortfall in food production can have a serious impact.

In Duguna Fango, one of the worst-hit districts not far from the local capital Sodo, farmer Yangago Bunja explained what the loss of his burnt and withered maize meant for his family.

Forty years old, he has eight children ranging in age from four months to 18 years old.

“We have nothing. We have a really big problem,” he said.

The last three years had been the same, he said.

Mr Yangago said he had tried to fend for his family by working in other places as a daily labourer.

But his children were losing weight and two of them were sick. He said sickness among the children was a problem for their whole community.

Abebech Adabbo and Abebech Tafesse say their children are suffering

The only other way he could get food was to borrow from somebody – but lenders want interest.

“It is God who has been feeding us all this time. We are just praying,” he said.

On the way to Wolayta there are a good many other fields where the maize crop has been lost to a lengthy drought and erratic, inadequate rain – sometimes, oddly, right alongside a plot where the maize looks much healthier.

The failure of crops and the loss of pasture for livestock is sufficiently widespread in Ethiopia for an expected announcement by the government to call for emergency food aid to feed 6.2 million people.

Some aid officials believe that could prove to be a conservative figure.

And it is on top of the food aid to support more than seven million people under a scheme for those who are most chronically vulnerable to hunger during lean periods of the year.

It also comes as the UN’s food agency has warned that – across the world – there are more hungry people and there is less food aid than ever before.

Ethiopian officials accept that the devastating famine of the mid-1980s is part of the country’s history but they are anxious that the abiding images of starvation from that time should not be a prism through which the country’s prospects are viewed today.

Government spokesman Bereket Simon talks of the efforts being made to improve agricultural productivity, to conserve water and soil and generally to help farmers become more capable of resisting the more frequent droughts that are part of the impact of climate change.

Enabling more farmers to have the benefits of irrigation would, of course, be part of that, too.

Iconic image

In his hard-hit part of rural Wolayta, Mr Yangago says some farmers in the area now have pumps to irrigate their land but he cannot afford to do so.

And given that his main crop has now failed again, it seems even less likely to happen in the near future.

The maize farmers are in urgent need of rain
It is not just the strategies for supporting farmers with failing crops that will be tested in the coming weeks. So will the new approach to trying to save the lives of children who become severely malnourished.

The feeding centres of the past were an iconic image of the 1984 famine.

They have given way to mothers collecting Plumpy’nut – a mix of peanut butter, sugar and nutrients – from their local health post and feeding it to malnourished children at home.

The most vulnerable children are supposed to be sent to stabilisation centres.

Abebech Adabbo’s 12-month-old son is being treated this way. The child has scarring on his head that a health worker said was the result of malnutrition.

And Abebech Tafesse hold her four-year old boy in her arms. He still has thin legs but she fells he is improving.

The mothers said it was shortage of food that had weakened the two children – two among many on the front line as Ethiopia faces the challenge once again of preventing a crisis becoming something worse.

Zenawi's 11% Growth Adds Up

In Ethiopia, 13.7 million people are at risk of severe hunger and need help, Oxfam said. Many are selling cattle to buy food. Farmers in northern Uganda have lost half their crops.

NAIROBI (Reuters) – Drought for a fifth year running is driving more than 23 million east Africans in seven countries towards severe hunger and destitution, international aid agency Oxfam said on Tuesday.

Launching a $9.5 million (6 million pounds) appeal, it said the situation was being worsened by high food prices and conflict. The most badly hit nations are Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia and Uganda.

Malnutrition is now above emergency levels in some areas and hundreds of thousands of valuable cattle are dying.

“This is the worst humanitarian crisis Oxfam has seen in east Africa for over ten years,” Paul Smith Lomas, Oxfam’s East Africa Director, said in a statement.

He said failed and unpredictable rains were ever more common in the region, and that broader climate change meant wet seasons were becoming shorter. Droughts have increased from once a decade to every two or three years.

“In Wajir, northern Kenya, almost 200 dead animals were recently found around one dried-up water source,” Lomas said.

“People are surviving on two litres of water a day in some places — less water than a toilet flush. The conditions have never been so harsh or so inhospitable, and people desperately need our help to survive.”

Some 3.8 million Kenyans, a tenth of the population, need emergency aid, Oxfam said, partly because food prices have risen to 180 percent above average.

One in six children are acutely malnourished in Somalia, the charity said, while conflict meant people were less able to grow food and drought is ravaging areas where people have fled. Half the population — more than 3.8 million people — are affected.

In Ethiopia, 13.7 million people are at risk of severe hunger and need help, Oxfam said. Many are selling cattle to buy food. Farmers in northern Uganda have lost half their crops.

Other countries hard hit are Sudan, Djibouti and Tanzania.

Rains are due next month, but are likely to bring scant relief or even deluges that could dramatically worsen matters.

Oxfam said there were fears that east Africa could be hit by floods that would destroy crops and homes, as well as increasing the spread of water-borne diseases.

“The aid response to the crisis needs to rapidly expand, but it is desperately short of funds,” the charity said, adding that the U.N.’s World Food Programme was facing a $977 million donor shortfall for its Horn of Africa work over the next six months.

“Even with normal rain, the harvest will not arrive until early 2010. People will still need aid to get them through a long hunger season,” it said.

(Additional reporting and writing by Daniel Wallis; editing by Tim Pearce)

Daniel Bekele: I accept such a prestigious award with a genuine sense of humility. I hold this award in the name of my fellow colleagues working for the promotion of human rights in Ethiopia. I am humbled by such global level recognition of the human rights work in Ethiopia; but it is also a constant reminder of the human rights situation in my country.

In the ever-shrinking space for freedom of expression and association in Ethiopia, Daniel Bekele has faced heavy-handed government repression as a prominent anti-poverty activist and human rights lawyer. Daniel has dedicated his life to building a vibrant civil society and strengthening human rights in a country where freedom of expression and other fundamental rights are severely constricted.

After leading grassroots efforts to promote voter education and election monitoring Daniel was arrested following the controversial 2005 parliamentary elections and spent two and a half years in prison on politically motivated charges of conspiracy and incitement to overthrow the government. He and fellow human rights activist Netsanet Demissie were the last two people released after a high-profile trial that originally charged 131 journalists, politicians, and civil society leaders with crimes ranging from genocide to treason.

Although he had an opportunity to secure his early release by joining co-defendants in signing a letter of apology to the government, Daniel instead chose to stand trial and contest the charges in court, testing the rule of law as a matter of principle. He was eventually convicted in a deeply flawed trial in which even the judges acknowledged that Daniel and Netsanet’s civil society activities were legitimate and even commendable.

Since his release in 2008, the Ethiopian government has adopted the Charities and Societies Proclamation, a new law on nongovernmental organizations that is so restrictive as to make the work of most human rights groups in Ethiopia illegal. Human Rights Watch honors Daniel Bekele who, at great personal risk, challenges the Ethiopian government to uphold the civil and political rights that protect all people.

Daniel Bekele made the following statement upon hearing about the award announcement:

“I accept such a prestigious award with a genuine sense of humility. I hold this award in the name of my fellow colleagues working for the promotion of human rights in Ethiopia. I am humbled by such global level recognition of the human rights work in Ethiopia; but it is also a constant reminder of the human rights situation in my country.

Poverty, political conflict and lack of good governance have created a disheartening socio-political quagmire and a very poor record of human rights; however, a gradual transition to rule of law and a peaceful democratic political order is not entirely hopeless. While a constitutional level guarantee of human rights is a positive step forward; the real protection of the most basic human rights remains a daunting challenge. I hope we shall overcome the seemingly insurmountable challenges with citizens re-engaging in democracy in a peaceful way.

I thank Human Rights Watch for this award and its valuable work; and I thank my family, fellow colleagues and friends globally for your kind support.”

Source: Human Rights Watch

Disagreement of the brutal tyrant with his wife

Meles – Look, now we are found out of that enemy zon and flag.   Why don’t you transform the “EFFORT” money to my account?

Azeb – I am looking after our children, I am struggling to connect one end with another in order to reach from month to month.  I have to pay for their School fees, their comfort, their body guards. You know life is expensive in the West. Besides that, this servant of yours, I mean the one whome you.   Appointed as the enemies Ambasdor to this coutry you have come .   Drinks too much For he is distressed thinking you may fire him from his post. His daily bread of whisky including his frieands coasts me a fortune!

Meles – I don’t care about the enemy land, people and flag, even this so called “Ambasador” and yourself with the children could all go to hell! I have’nt snatched the “EFFORT” leadership from that old idiot “Sebhat” without aim. I had a plan to empower you to this big and  responssible post eventhough I knew from the beginning that your    small brain and ignorance were not worth that. I knew that you were good in swindeling and so I used you then!  Now immedietly transform the money to the Indonesian Banks in my account, I have no time, I even see the enemy flags waving even here!

Azeb -  My dear, ok, I will transform it to you wherever you wish, but the problem is, nowadays the enemy’s flag you hate the most is everywhere and I don’t know where to hide myself and our Children.  Karl Marx, save us from the Sea of the GREEN, YELLOW, and RED flags!

(WEGESHAW 30/09/2009)

ABSTRACT 

The aim of this paper is to study the merits and the demerits of colonial boundaries in Africa by using the Ethiopia-Sudan boundary as a case study. The paper tries to examine how the existing boundary between the two countries came into being in the early 20th century. The present-day boundary between Ethiopia and Sudan is principally the result of the 1902 and 1907 Anglo-Ethiopian delimitation treaties which were demarcated in 1903 and 1909 respectively. At present, there is confusion and controversy in Ethiopia, particularly, after the exposure of the alleged “secret” re-demarcation deal between the current governments of Ethiopia and Sudan that resulted, according to various media reports, in the ceding of huge Ethiopian border land to Sudan along their common border. This paper explores the historical background of the boundary conflict and gives an insight to the current boundary problem between Ethiopia and Sudan. 

Key words: Africa, Anglo-Abyssinia, Boundary, Ethiopia, Haile Selassie I, Major Charles Gwynn, Menelik II, Sudan. 

1. INTRODUCTION  

Ethiopia and Sudan share a very long boundary of 1600 km length. Apart from their relations as neighbors, Ethiopia and Sudan have many common features. As Yacob (2007: 193) noted, the term “Ethiopia” is a Greek word for “dark” or black”. Similarly the term “Sudan” is an Arabic word for “dark” or “black”. Tribes such as Nuer, Anwak and Berta live in both Ethiopia and Sudan along the border areas. Many rivers from Ethiopia such as Atbara, Blue Nile (Abay), Mereb and Sobat flow to Sudan. The Ethiopia-Sudan border has two distinct marks. From the Eritrean border to Blue Nile River (where the two regions of Ethiopia, Tigray and Amhara lie) the international boundary manifests a genuine ethnic divide. In this part of the international border no major tribes live on both sides of the border. In the second part of the border that stretches from the Nile River to the Ethiopia’s border with Kenya where Ethiopian regions such as the Beni Shangul Gumuz, Gambella, and the SNNP (Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples) are located many tribes live on either side of the border. Young (Young 2007: 17) describes the border population as follows:

 “From the Eritrean border down to just north of the Blue Nile River, the international boundary represents a genuine ethnic divide with only a handful of small pastoralist tribes traversing the two countries. No major tribes live on both sides of the border. From the Blue Nile south to the border with Kenya,  however, many tribes live on either side of the frontier, most notably the Berta,  Anuak, Nuer, Mursi, Murle, and Yangatum; the Gumuz and Hamer are based in Ethiopia but also cross the border area.” 

In the second half of the 19th century and in the first half of the 20th century, the British, representing their colonies (i.e., Sudan, Kenya and the British Somaliland) signed various treaties with independent Ethiopia to demarcate the Ethiopia-Sudan, Ethiopia-Kenya and Ethiopia-British Somaliland boundaries. This paper attempts to examine the various Anglo-Ethiopian agreements and treaties concerning the demarcation of the Ethiopia-Sudan boundary.  

The boundary between Ethiopia and Sudan is very important in the political history of Ethiopia particularly starting from the 19th century. This is because, Quara, the birth place of Theodros II1, is located along the border. Secondly, it was at Metema along the border between Ethiopia and Sudan that Emperor Yohannes (r. 1871-1889) died fighting against the Dervish of Sudan in 1889. Thirdly, in 1941, Emperor Haile Selassie I (r.1930-1974) returned to Ethiopia from his exile in England to fight the Italians together with the British forces by crossing the Ethiopia-Sudan border and hoisted the Ethiopian flag at the place called Omedla, along the border with Sudan. Fourthly, many Ethiopian patriots stayed in Sudan during the military occupation of Ethiopia by Italy in 1936-1941. Fifthly, the current Ethiopian rulers, the former rebels fought and defeated the Derg (1974-1991) by the support of Sudan after waging an armed struggle for about 16 years. Therefore the border area between Ethiopia and Sudan has a very special place in the social, economic and political developments in Ethiopia. It is also important to note that even in the post 1991 period many Ethiopian opposition forces (ex., OLF, EPPF)2 use the Sudanese soil as a launching pad in their war against the current Ethiopian government. 

For Akihiro (2005: 95) “the most delicate and touchiest of problems between any two countries are territorial issues.” Most of the time territorial change is a painful process and it has a great impact not only upon the individuals and communities that inhabit the areas involved but also upon the international community and the states concerned (Shaw 1997). According to Dzurek (1999-2000), the international community views some boundary disputes as more important than others due to various reasons. The main ones include: the size of the disputed area, the magnitude of the antagonism of the claimants, the involvement of ethnic conflicts in the disputes area, historic animosity between the disputants, the occurrence of recent violence in the area, the weakness of the disputants and their inability to control activities on their frontiers, the size of the area involved, the number of inhabitants at risk, the resources of the dispute area, the strategic nature of the disputed area, the number of people killed in the area, the number of claimants, third party involvement, and religious differences in the disputed area. 

The paper attempts to answer the following research questions:

(1) What are the merits and the demerits of African colonial boundaries?

(2) How did the successive governments of Ethiopia tackle the country’s relation with Sudan? 

(3) How did Ethiopia demarcate its boundary with Sudan during the colonial era?

(4) What are the consequences of the Ethiopia-Sudan colonial border? 

2. CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS 

Scholars of boundary studies have recently attempted to identify the conceptual differences and similarities among the terms, boundary, frontier, and border. Though most of the time these terms are considered synonyms and are used interchangeably, in the academic world attempts have been made to analyze their conceptual differences and similarities (Rankin and Schofieed 2004). Anderson (1996: 10) employed the term “frontier” to denote an international boundary, and “boundary” to designate divisions at the sub-state level. However, in order to avoid unnecessary confusion in this paper I have decided to employ these terms interchangeably.

Caflisch (2006: 2) defines international boundary as “a line dividing land territory over which states exercise full territorial sovereignty.” According to Shaw (1997), 

“International boundaries fix permanent lines, both geographically and legally, with full effect within the international system, and can only be changed through the consent of the relevant states. Such boundaries have important consequences with regard to international responsibility and jurisdiction.” 

Korkor (2001) divides boundaries into “general” boundaries, and “fixed” boundaries. In general boundary the exact line of the boundary is left undetermined, whereas fixed boundary is the one that is accurately surveyed and guaranteed. According to Smith (1995: 475-484), there are two types of borders: bona fide borders, and fiat borders. Bona fide borders are physical boundaries such as river banks, coastlines and they exist in the absence of delineating activity. In other words, they exist independently of all human cognitive acts. On the other hand, fiat boundaries are the creations of humans

and hence involve human decision. Another scholar, Krukoski (n.d), categorizes boundaries into two: Natural (geometric), and artificial boundaries. Natural boundaries involve hydric boundaries, water courses, dry boundaries, mountain ranges etc. On the other hand, artificial boundaries are boundaries marked by monuments or boundary marks that are put over the boundary. Artificial borders are borders that “depend neither on physical characteristics nor ethnic characteristics” (Özcan 2002: 49). For Özcan (2002:50) artificial borders are the cause of many border disputes. That is why there exists a belief that “natural” boundaries are good while “artificial” boundaries are bad (Caflisch 2006:4). However, we should keep in mind that at present “there is no rule of international law under which ‘natural’ boundaries enjoy priority over ‘artificial’ ones” (Caflisch 2006:4). 

As Özcan (2002: 48) and Blake (1995: 44) noted, borders are established in four stages:3 “historical precedent” (“allocation”), “delimitation,” “demarcation,” and “characterization” (“management”). Jones (1945) also identifies four stages in boundary making. These are :“(1) political decisions on the allocation of territory (2) delimitation of the boundary in a treaty (3) demarcation of the boundary on the ground (4 ) administration of the boundary.”4 

Brown (1994: 66) defines “allocation” as “the initial understanding between states as to their territorial claims; lines may be crudely drawn on maps, but no accurate or precise description or field survey has been attempted.” “Allocation” or “historical precedent” involves the process of identifying the cultural characteristics of the people in the area and considering the previous attempts to establish a border. This phase is the cause of many border conflicts in Africa because most of the borders of former colonies in Africa lack these precedents. This stage, according to Blake (1995: 44), usually is the responsibility of diplomats, soldiers and statesmen. In Africa, particularly at the onset of colonialism in the 19th century, European colonial countries agreed very crudely to divide Africa into sphere of influences without fighting each other. The Berlin Conference (1884) was one of the most important agreements on this aspect. Though it is the first stage of boundary making, allocation involves the use of the available maps as important sources of information. In this stage, the politicians need the support of the various teams of advisors (lawyers, historians, economists etc) and technical experts5 (in cartography, geography, geodesy, computer science etc.). 

Delimitation refers to the “description of the alignment in a treaty or other written document, or by means of a line marked on a map” (Brown: 1994: 66). Krukoski (n.d.) defines delimitation as “the establishment and ratification of the treaties that deal with the subject /boundary/. During this phase, negotiators from both countries decide, in face of the existing documentation, how is the boundary line to be traced between the two territories.” Delimitation, therefore, “is essentially a political process.” It is the signing and ratification of treaties on border issues. In this phase, negotiators of both sides determine the boundary line based on the existing documentation on paper (Özcan 2002:48) and the negotiators of both parties define the boundary in detail. For Blake (1995: 46) delimitation is the critical phase of boundary making and most of the time, it is done by a joint commission. In the early years of boundary commissions in Africa boundary commissioners used to conduct their own rough surveys. The British, for instance, established the Royal Engineer officers6 to delimit the borders of their colonies. At present, technological advances have simplified boundary delimitation. Advances in technologies such as satellite imagery give latest and accurate information about the landscape. Another up to date technology very useful for boundary delimitation is Global Positioning System (GPS). According to Blake (1995: 45), GPS 

“Is usually a simple and speedy method of positioning to within an accuracy of two metres or less if done with top quality equipment.  GPS has truly revolutionised the process of boundary delimitation. Its prime use is in the location of demarcation sites after delimitation, and producing a set of boundary coordinates to be used for treaty purposes. GPS clearly enables interested parties to test the accuracy of past boundaries where these were delimited by coordinates in a treaty, and marked out on the ground in accordance with those coordinates.“

The third phase, “demarcation” involves interpreting the intentions of the delimiters on the ground. This phase is a technical or mechanical phase involving erecting monuments and sign posts (Özcan 2002:49). According to Brown (1994: 66), demarcation “is the means by which the described alignment is marked or evidenced on the ground, by means of cairns of stones, concrete pillars etc.”  Demarcation comes when, 

“The demarcators try to interpret on the terrain the intentions of the delimiters. This is a technical phase, which can offer some difficulties of interpretation in finding on the terrain the rivers, lakes, mountains or other landmark that has served as the base for the delimitation” (Krukoski n.d). 

In the demarcation process, demarcating monuments or markers are erected that define the lines of the boundary of the countries7. This stage involves records such as maps, sketches, photographs, etc (Blake 1995: 47).8

The last phase is “characterization” or “maintenance”. In this phase “new marks are erected in order to satisfy the necessities of the population growth along the borders” (Özcan 2002: 49). This stage is the management and administration of boundaries (Blake 1995: 47) and it is a continuous process (Özcan 2002:49). The most important problem at this stage is the difficulty for large states with long boundaries to manage and administer their borders because, usually the cost of boundary management is very high9 (Özcan 2002: 49). Boundary marks are also categorized as primary and secondary marks (Rushworth 1997:61). According to Krukoski (n.d), primary marks are erected during demarcation phase and the secondary marks are placed during characterization phase. International boundary dispute according to Prescott (1987) are generally of three kinds: territorial, positional, and functional. Territorial disputes occur when countries contest for large tracts of land (Blake 1995: 48). Positional disputes are disputes that usually follow boundary allocation. They usually happen before delimitation. But, sometimes, they can also occur after delimitation (Blake 1995: 48). Functional disputes arise in relation to boundaries every day management, and operation (Blake 1995: 48). 

3. COLONIAL BORDERS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES IN AFRICA 

In the last two decades boundary problems and demarcation-related issues in Africa were the subjects of intense discussion among scholars. The main ones include: Abbink (2003), Bouquet (2003), Brownlie (1979), Englud (2003, 2002), Griffiths (1996), Konings (2005), Kornprobst (2002: 369-393), Lentz (2003), Nugent and Asiwaja (1996), Oduntan (2006), and Pratt (2006). So far, however, only scant works such as Gwynn (1937) are available on Ethiopia’s border with Sudan. 

Borders are imagined lines that are rarely demarcated on the ground, “demonstrating their nature as artificial, historical construction and alleged, political invention” (Brambilla n.d: 3). Borders in Africa were introduced during colonialism10. As indicated by Bentsi-Enchill (1976), Asiwaju (1984), Jackson and Roseberg (1982), and Davidson (1992) colonial borders were created without the knowledge, consent and consultation of the African people.11 Therefore, due to their colonial origin the boundaries of contemporary Africa are usually considered arbitrary (Ajala 1983, Asiwaju 1985, Atzili 2004; Barbour 1961, Bello 1995, Brownlie 1979, Davidson 1992, Kum 1993, Nugent 1996, Nugent and Asiwaju 1996, Sautter 1982, Touval 1969).  Loisel (2004: 4) characterized the African borders as follows: “Borders in Africa would be arbitrary and artificial, delineated by exogenous colonial powers with little knowledge of the local communities, dividing pre-existing and homogeneous ethnic groups and thereby stirring frustrations and conflicts.” 

There have been many controversies and arguments concerning the arbitrary nature of African boundaries. For Davidson (1992) the arbitrariness of the colonial borders and the dissection of ethnic groups and tribes (and even sometimes families) in the colonial era are the major causes of African conflicts12. In other words, the ethnic wars that are caused by the arbitrary nature of African boundaries are the major causes for instability in the continent. Therefore, for Griggs (1995a, 1997) the mismatch between nations and states is responsible for the continents instability, civil war, genocides etc.

For Loisel (2004: 4) these borders are not only arbitrary but they were also the product of continental and global rivalries among European powers. Therefore, according to Loisel (2004: 4), citing Miles (1994: 68), 

“Borders were drawn essentially according to the geopolitical, economic and administrative interests of the colonial powers, often taken into account at a global scale. The most often cited example is that of the division of the Hausaland, between today’s Niger and Nigeria. The Franco-British treaties of 1904 and 1906 redrew the border in favor of the French side, in exchange for France’s renunciation of fishing rights off the coast of Newfoundland” (Miles, 1994: 68).

Odugbemi (1995) and Clapham (1996) argue that everywhere borders are artificial and the case of Africa is not different from others. According to Nugent (1996) and Bach (1999), though African boundaries are arbitrary they have also advantages. Herbst (2000) has also reinforced this argument. Herbst (2000) argues that African boundaries are assets for state consolidation. For Touval (1969) and Ottaway (1999) the arbitrary nature of African boundaries has only few disadvantages. Scholars like Barbour (1961), Griffiths (1996), Bayart (1996) and Young (1996) advocate for the status quo of African colonial boundaries despite their arbitrariness because attempting to reshuffle states is more costly than the hypothetical benefits. There are also scholars who advocated for territorial reconfiguration of African boundaries (Bello 1995; Herbst 2000; Nkiwane 1993; Sambanis 1999). 

Though from the start the Organization of African Unity (OAU) acknowledged the imperfections of the national boundaries of African countries (which were the by-products of Colonialism) it decided to accept the inviolability of the national boundaries in its 1964 resolution (DFID 2001:6; Atzili 2004). According to Francis Borella, cited in Wembou (1994: 16), 

 “Many resolutions adopted by the OAU continually strengthen the territorial foundation of the African States and their respective frontiers. Resolution A.G.H/16.1 of July 21, 1964, to cite just one, incorporates the rule of uti possidetis: ‘All the member States are committed to respect the frontiers existing at the time of their independence.’” 

Therefore, after the disintegration of colonialism all African governments except Morocco and Somalia agreed to maintain colonial boundaries (Englebert et al Feb. 2001).13  

Territorial or border disputes are one of the major causes for war14, and most of the wars and bloodsheds due to territorial disputes occurred in Africa (Griggs 1994, 1995a, 1995b). Due to the arbitrary nature of the colonial boundaries, right after the end of colonialism a border dispute has become one of the causes for conflicts in Africa as manifested in boundary disputes between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Abbink 2003, 1998; Fielding 1999: 89-97; Pearce 2000; Pratt 2006; Korkor 2001; Sodeinde 2001), Nigeria and Cameron (Dzurek 1999; Konings 2005; Oduntan 2006; Aghemelo and Ibhasebhor 2006; Korkor 2001; Sodeinde 2001), Ethiopia and Somalia (Hoyle 2000), Somalia and Kenya (Kromm 1967), Mozambique and Malawi (Englund 2002), Botswana and Namibia (Korkor 2001, Perry 2000), Eritrea and Djibouti (DeCapua, 11 June 2008; VOA 11 June 2008), Sudan and Egypt (Dzurek 1999-2000:83-95; Time 3 July 1995), Sudan and Kenya (Mburu 22 March 2003), Uganda and Congo DR (Mugabi 13 May 2008), Zambia and Zimbabwe (Dzurek 1999-2000:83-95), Malawi and Tanzania (Mayall 1973) and so on. In a rare instance an African country, Eritrea, had fought a border war with a non-African country, Yemen over the Hanish Islands (Dzurek 1996; Kwiatkowska 2001; Westing 1996: 201-206). 

Except Ethiopia which successfully fought for the preservation of its independence and territorial integrity, almost all African countries are the creation of European colonialists. Some countries in Africa such as Congo DR and Sudan got very large territory and natural resources thanks to the generosity of European pens, while other African countries were not lucky and got very small territories (E.g. Burundi, Rwanda, Swaziland, Lesotho, Gambia, Djibouti, and Equatorial Guinea) (Griggs 1997: 66).  

4. ETHIOPIA AND SUDAN: POLITICAL RELATIONS AND BOUNDARY DEMARCATION  

4.1. The Reign of Yohannes IV and the Ethiopia-Sudan Relations  

Though many historical and archaeological evidences indicate the very long economic and political relations between Ethiopia and Sudan15, their most visible relations in the modern period started in the 19th century. In the early 19th Century, the Egyptians attempted to occupy Ethiopia after conquering Sudan16, and Massawa area (Eritrea). In the battle of Gundet (1875) and Gura (7-9 March 1876) Emperor Yohannes IV (r. 1872-1889) of Ethiopia repulsed the Egyptians attack. The British colonized Egypt in 1882 and assumed responsibility for her possessions including Sudan. In the mean time, the Mahdists17  of Sudan (Dervishes or Ansar) started a revolt in June 1881 against the oppressive rule of the Anglo-Egyptians and encircled the Egyptians army in Kassala18

. Therefore, when Egyptian troops were besieged in Khartoum by the Mahdists the British decided to intervene. It is with this intention they sent a British negotiator Rear Admiral Sir William Hewett to the court of Yohannes to solicit the support of Ethiopian troops. A treaty was signed on 3 June 1884. The treaty is known as the Hewett treaty or Adwa treaty, after the city where the treaty was signed. In this treaty, on behalf of Egypt, Britain allowed Yohannes free import of goods, ammunition, Egyptian facilitation of the appointment of bishops, and the restoration of Bogos to Ethiopia. On his turn, Yohannes agreed to facilitate the evacuation of the besieged Egyptian troops from Kassala, Amideb and Sanhit towns of Sudan (The New York Times 25 July 1884). This action of Yohannes led to a war between Ethiopian forces and the Dervishes of Sudan (New York

Times 20 February 1888; 17 February 1888). On 23 September 1888, Ras Alula, one of the loyal generals of Yohannes successfully fought the Mahdists led by Uthman Dinqna at Kufit (east of Kasala) (Bahru 2002: 58). In retaliation, the Mahdists invaded Asosa (in Benishangul-Gumuz region) following the footsteps of the Egyptians who had sphere of influence in the area, but were repulsed by the Ethiopian troops when they approached Najjo area (Wollega) on October 14, 1888 (Bahru 2002: 59). In the northern front, the Mahdists occupied Metema (which was evacuated by the Egyptians). King Teklehaymanot of Gojam was ordered by Emperor Yohannes to fight against the Dervishes. Teklehaymanot’s army, after initial victory, was routed by the Dervishes. The Dervishes also raided Dambiya and Gondar (in Amhara region) after defeating the Ethiopian governor and the vassal of Yohannes in the area, King Teklehaymanot. In the mean time, the leader of the Dervishes, Khalifa Abdallah19, sent an ultimatum to Emperor Yohannes as claimed by Sanderson (1969: 19). The Khalifa in his ultimatum said, “…If you will do what I tell you, then I will cease to wage war against you and will instruct my army not to enter your country” (Sanderson, 1969: 19). Then, Khalifa’s army invaded and sacked Gondar town. With the aim of avoiding war with the Dervishes (Since he had already faced the threat of the Italians in North Ethiopia) Emperor Yohannes, sent a peace offer to the Dervish leader. According to Sanderson (1969: 70), the emperor wrote:  

„Let us not kill the poor and the harmless to no purpose, but let us both unite against our common enemies, the Europeans. If they conquer me, they will not spare you, but will destroy your country…. It is, therefore, our common interest to agree to fight and conquer them. “ 

The Sudanese leader rejected Yohannes’ peace offer and the two sides fought a decisive battle at Metema on 9-10 March 1889 culminated by the death of Yohannes. The Dervishes beheaded Yohannes’ head and took it to Sudan as a trophy (Bahru 2002: 59; The New York Times 4 April 1889; 4 May 1889; Yacob 2007: 196). In the final analysis, as Rubenson (1976: 362) said, Yohannes traded “one weak enemy for two strong ones, (the Mahdist state and Italy)”. Yohannes fulfilled his part of the treaty by sending an army under Ras Alula and fought the Mahdists in order to give a free passage to the Egyptian troops. On the other hand, the British failed to honor the treaty, and allowed a new power in the area, the Italians, to occupy what the Egyptians left: Massawa (Eritrea) (Bahru 2002: 54-56).

4.2. The Reign of Menelik II (1889-1913) and the Anglo-Ethiopian Border Treaty 

After the death of Yohannes in 1889, Menelik II (r. 1889-1913) became the emperor of Ethiopia. In his early years as emperor of Ethiopia, Menelik wanted peaceful relations with Sudan. Particularly, the threat from Italy forced Menelik to look for potential allies in case he was forced to fight against the Italian forces who by that time increased their aggression against Menelik’s empire from the north. Unfortunately, the Sudanese leader was still keeping his grudges against Ethiopia and was reluctant to forge an alliance with Ethiopia against Europeans. Therefore, Ethiopia was forced to fight the Italians alone. In 1896, at the battle of Adwa, Menelik scored a resounding victory against the Italians. The Adwa victory greatly increased the image of Menelik in the international world. Many European countries, particularly, the French, the British, the Germans etc., sent emissaries to Menelik asking for his friendship. This time, the Sudanese leader Khalifa Abdellah, was also interested to forge an alliance with Menelik. Therefore, when Menelik renewed his call for friendship with Sudan, the Sudanese leader did not waste time to accept the offer. The Khalifa sent Mohammad Othman to Menelik’s court with few preconditions (Berry 1968: 8). The Khalifa requested Menelik to renounce all his relations with Europeans as a precondition to make an alliance with Sudan. Menelik rejected the precondition of the Sudan, but in 1897 both countries reached a sort of agreement to form an alliance. According to Berry (1968: 84), as a sign of friendship, Menelik secretly notified the Khalifa of the imminent invasion of Sudan by the Anglo-Egyptian forces. In return, the Khalifa withdrew his alliance with the Shaik of Benishangul20 who had been very active in resisting Menelik’s over lordship. In September 1898, the Anglo-Egyptian forces led by Kitchener re-conquered Sudan and defeated the Mahdists. Only in 1956 Sudan re-gained its independence (Yacob 2007: 196). 

The Ethiopia-Sudan Boundary Delimitation and Demarcation Background  

The architect of the border demarcation between Ethiopia and Sudan during colonialism was Major (later General) Charles Gwynn21, an Irish explorer. Until Charles Gwynn came to the border area, the boundary between Sudan (then under Britain) and independent Ethiopia was not delimited or demarcated. As Gwynn himself (1937: 150) admitted, “Owing to their great extent, and to the obvious difficulty of policing such backward and unprofitable regions thoroughly, the frontiers have never been demarcated with the elaboration customary in most countries.” Gwynn (1937: 150) listed four major problems that hindered the Ethiopia-Sudan demarcation process at that time. These were: 

(1) Lack of aeroplanes and motor transport that could be useful for making reconnaissance trips and to transport supplies needed for the laborers on the scene.

(2) The shortage of food and water supplies for the laborers since few supplies were obtainable in the border district.

(3) The failure of the Ethiopian22 government to send trained and educated personnel to represent the Ethiopian side.

(4) The unwillingness of the Ethiopian government to employ Europeans to represent Ethiopia in the demarcation process23. 

Gwynn (1937: 150, 160) frankly admitted that in light of all the above factors attempting to properly demarcate the boundary “would have entailed great waste of money.” Though the British took control of Egypt and its colony Sudan in 1882, till 1902 they were not able to delimit Sudan’s border with Ethiopia. In addition, for British authorities in Sudan let alone demarcating the Ethiopia-Sudan border, even their political control in Sudan itself was in a great danger due to the rebellion of the Sudanese people led by Khalifa, the successor of Mahdi. The Sudanese freedom fighters were able to expel the Anglo-Egyptians from Khartoum and the surrounding areas for some time24. Moreover, the British were worried that Menelik would join the Khalifa of Sudan against their interest in the area (New York Times 23 May 1897). Therefore, with this in mind, they sent a delegation known as the “Rodd Mission”25 to Addis Ababa in 1896-97; “mainly,” says Gwynn (1937: 150), “to prevent the possibility of his making common cause with the Khalifa”. Moreover, the British wanted a confirmation from Menelik of his recognition of “British and Egyptian territorial rights throughout the regions of the White Nile, including Kordofan and Dar Sennaar” (New York Times 7 March 1897). The Road mission was accompanied by Captain Harrington who was a British political officer in Somaliland. The Rodd mission was successful in convincing Menelik not to side with Khalifa. According to the Figaro, reported by The New York Times (22 September 1897) “the mission of James Rennell Rodd to the king of Abyssinia resulted in a promise of neutrality upon the part of king Menelik by guaranteeing the Western frontier of Abyssinia in the names of both Great Britain and the Mahdi.” 

The second aim of the delegation, i.e. getting Menelik’s consent on border demarcation26 (which Captain Harrington was entrusted with) was not that much progressed as the British expected. In the negotiations with the Rodd Mission, the wise Menelik forced the British to give him concessions. The New York Times (12 January 1898), quoting the Birmingham Post reported: 

“The treaty which James Rennell Rodd, principal secretary of the British Agency and consulate General in Egypt, negotiated with king Menelik of Abyssinia, contains a clause binding king Menelik not to allow any obstacle to emanate from Abyssinian territory with the object of blocking the Egyptian advance upon Khartoum. As a quid pro quo king Menelik secures a certain rectification of the frontier when the Khalifa is subdued.” 

The British re-conquered Sudan after defeating the Mahdists in 1897. The greatest fear of the British (immediately after they re-conquered Khartoum by defeating the Mahdists) was the reaction of Menelik. They thought that Menelik would march against their forces in Sudan. On this issue, the New York Times held a discussion with M. Casimir Mondon Vidailhet, the director of public education in Ethiopia (The New York Times 25 September 1898). To the question whether Menelik would march against British forces in Sudan Vidailhet responded,  

 “The Emperor Menelik will certainly never take the offensive against the British……But should they attempt to conquer any territory which at present forms an integral portion of the Empire of Ethiopia that empire which represents a high degree of civilization in the Dark Continent-then they will most certainly be opposed by the army of the Negus, 300,000 strong, and capable of being increased to a considerable extent” (The New York Times 25 September 1898). 

The British had also another reason to fear Menelik’s military retaliation. Contrary to the expectation of Menelik, the Anglo-Egyptian forces controlled Kassala by conniving with the Italians when the Italians evacuated from the area after their defeat by Menelik’s force in 1896 at Adwa. When Menelik learned that Kassala was handed over to Egyptian (Anglo-Egyptian) forces after the evacuation of the Italians, he was very much angry and mobilized his army for confrontation.27 It was reported in the New York Times (23 January 1898) that alarmed by Menelik’s sudden move, the British rushed a reinforcement army to Egypt. According to the New York Times (23 January 1898), “Col. Parsons, while enroute to take over Kassala from the Italians, found king Menelik of Abyssinia in the greatest state of Wrath at the surrender to Egyptians of the town, which his Majesty regarded as part of his domain, and he was mobilizing an army, with the intention of asserting his authority.” 

Alarmed by the activities of Menelik’s forces in the border areas the British decided to demarcate Sudan’s border with Ethiopia and extend their rule in Kenya. According to Gwynn (1937: 151),

“When ……early in 1889, Harrington succeeded in getting Menelik’s agreement to at tentative frontier it could only be represented by a blue chalk line drawn on the map without any very definite topographical or ethnographical meaning. It did, however, recognise that Beni Shangul, a large district south of the Blue Nile above the limit of navigation,  which had formerly been in Egyptian hands but which had been conquered by Menelik in 1898, should be treated definitely as having passed to Abyssinia.” 

During 1899 Summer Harrington went back to England with his map and the British decided to further explore the region (the border area) and “to get an idea as to how far effective Abyssinian occupation extended” (Gwynn 1937: 151). Therefore, the British prepared two teams of expedition. The first team consisting Major Austin, R.E., and Captain Bright 28 from Rifle Brigade was assigned to explore the region from the Sobat South to Lake Rudolf (Gwynn 1937: 151). The second team was lead by Charles Gwynn and Lieut. Jakson R.E. This team was assigned to explore the section between the Blue Nile and the Sobat river (Gwynn 1937: 151). From Omdurman Major Austin’s team was transported to the Sobat by steamer, but Gwynn’s team was not able to get a steamer due to a low and falling Nile. Therefore, Gwynn’s team was forced to employ native boats and made its way up the Blue Nile to Roseiles. As Gwynn (1937: 152) readily admitted, both teams were instructed by the British government “to pose as a semi-scientific, semi-shooting expedition, and to avoid discussing frontier questions with anyone, except possibly Abyssinian officers of some rank whom we might meet.” 

According to Gwynn (1937: 152), this was because, “it was obviously inadvisable to unsettle the local natives or to encourage them in any way to resist Abyssinian parties until the frontier question was settled and the Government [British]29 in a position to give them some protection.” 

As Gwynn (1937: 152) further narrated, they were also instructed:   

 “Not to enter without invitation any districts known to be occupied by Abyssinians, but we were as far as possible to ascertain the limits of such occupation and the position of Abyssinian posts. This especially applied to Beni Shangul, in which, as old Egyptian territory, our intentions might be open to suspicion.” 

Furthermore, the exploration teams were told “to make as good a map and to collect as much information as regards tribal boundaries and local conditions as the circumstances permitted, and to select physical features which might constitute recognisable landmarks for a frontier approximating to the blue line and to tribal limits.” Gwynn’s party was escorted by a small band of Sudanese army, and employed an Ethiopian interpreter called Daniel Desta (Gwynn 1937: 152). The first major task of Gwynn’s party was “to ascertain the limits of the Beni Shangul District and the conditions prevailing in it” (Gwynn 1937: 153). According to Gwynn (1937: 154), “….As the district had been definitely assigned to Abyssinia the chief problem was to ascertain its limits, especially how far the outlying hills should be included in it, and which could be taken as frontier marks.“ 

It is interesting to note that without proper study and in the absence of Ethiopian government representatives, Gwynn’s party arbitrarily decided to give the areas in the Benishangul region to Sudan. The only criterion he used to make this decision was the tribal fighting in the area. According to him, the outlying communities were living in fear due to their conflict with the people in Benishangul district (which was Ethiopian territory). He said, “I decided therefore to recommend that most of the detached hills should be included in the Sudan as this would correspond fairly well with the position of the blue line.”30 When Gwynn’s party reached Wallega province (in the present day Oromia region of Ethiopia) he met with Ethiopian officials in the area: Basha Zodi and Dejazmach Goti (Gwynn 1937: 155). The Ethiopian officials at first received Gwynn’s and his party with friendly gesture and offered them supplies. However, later on, they became suspicious of their movements in the area and detained them. 

On this issue Gwynn (1937: 156) said,  

 “I had only gone south for two days when I was overtaken by an armed party of his men insisting that I should return to Gidami as it was said that instructions had been received from Addis Ababa that I should go no further. I did not believe that any such instructions had been given, but clearly there was a risk of my main party getting into trouble if I did not return ; so back I came.“ 

In fact, Gwynn’s party was not the only European “exploration” mission to be caught and detained in making “explorations” without the knowledge and permission of the Ethiopian government. Other earlier missions including Bottego mission, General Mangin’s mission etc were caught and expelled. Concerning the detention, Gwynn (1937: 156-157) said,  

 “Our hold-up at Gidami was a typical illustration of the suspicion and refusal to accept responsibility which characterises all Abyssinians. Major Austin had a similar experience at Gore ;  and when, during the war, I met General Mangin I was interested to hear that he also had been detained for over a month at Gidami, which thus was distinguished for having stopped three European Expeditions in the course of a few years—Bottego’s, Mangin’s, and my own.“ 

After detained in Gidami (Wollega zone) for almost one month, Harrington was able to get Menelik’s “all clear” letter from Addis Ababa and Gwynn’s mission continued the expedition. After the end of the exploration, Gwynn and Colonel Harrington made another trip to meet Menelik in Addis Ababa to get the Emperor’s concurrence in them. However, Gwynn and Harrington did not get what they wanted from the Emperor. On this issue, Gwynn (1937: 158) confessed as follows:  

 “Harrington and I had a number of conferences with the old Emperor at which he produced various Abyssinians and some of the Beni Shangul chiefs to check my arguments and information. Nothing, however, could be definitely settled, partly on account of the dislike of all Abyssinians to come to a definite decision, partly because both north of the Blue Nile and south of the Sobat information was still lacking.”  

Despite their insistence, the careful Emperor was not interested to agree with the plan of the British without properly digesting it. Therefore, Gwynn went to resurvey the Sudan-Eritrean frontier “as nothing further could be obtained from Menelik” (Gwynn 1937: 158). According to Gwynn (1937: 158), it 

“Was not till the winter 1902-3, Harrington had succeeded in obtaining Menelik’s signature to a frontier agreement, and the latter had expressed his willingness that I should represent both Governments in the task of showing the line to his frontier chiefs, and in carrying out such demarcation in detail as was essential. That meant drawing up a programme and telegraphing it to Harrington to arrange for successive Abyssinian District authorities to meet me at certain times and places in order that they should become acquainted with the position of the boundary.”  

Concluding his delimitation work in the Sudan-Ethiopia border, Gwynn said, 

 “In the Beni Shangul area it was evident that Abyssinian authority was far from well established, and the truculent slave-raiding chiefs gave some trouble. As already stated they had to be taught a lesson by the Sudan Government later on.  As a result of the season’s work, however, the whole frontier was perambulated from the Setit River in the north to the junction of the Pibor and Akobo Rivers in the south. Physical features marking it were pointed out and a certain number of artificial marks erected where more detail was required. I was not, however, sanguine of the permanence of the latter unless frequently visited by patrols—a somewhat unlikely event.” 

The fact that Gwynn single-handedly “delimited” the Ethiopia-Sudan border without the physical presence of the Ethiopian government representatives31 has created border disputes between Sudan and Ethiopia for many decades. Still now it is the cause of the on-and-off tensions between Sudan and Ethiopia. In fact, Gwynn himself has sensed this and foretold the situation as follows:  

 “It was quite evident that respect for the frontier could only be enforced by adequate policing, and this was highly improbable considering the financial position of the Sudan Government, the valueless character of most of the frontier region, and the terrible depopulation of the country consequent on the Khalif ‘s regime and Abyssinian raiding. On the whole, however, the delimitation of the frontier provided a working basis for future dealings between the two Governments, which was about all that could be hoped for at the time.” 

After completing his work along Sudan-Ethiopia border, Gwynn once again was appointed as British commissioner to make a final demarcation of Kenya-Ethiopia Border. In order to carry out his new assignment he came back to Ethiopia in 1908-932

. Due to Menelik’s illness33 the Ethiopian government was not able to appoint either a European or Ethiopian representative to delimit and demarcate the border. Moreover, the Ethiopian government was not able to instruct district officials along the Kenya-Ethiopia border to accompany or help Gwynn’s new mission. Therefore, “after some months’ delay it was consequently decided that “Charles Gwynn “should carry out the work without accredited Abyssinian representatives” (Gwynn 1937: 160). Gwynn’s mission

along Kenya-Ethiopia border ended simply by showing “the local tribes the frontier that the British Government were prepared to recognize.” 

4.3. The Reign of Haile Selassie I (1930-1974) and the Ethio-Sudan Relations  

After Sudan achieved its independence in 1956 its relation with Ethiopia was not peaceful34. Between 1961 and 1974 there were armed groups along the Ethio-Sudan border that fought against Haile Selassie’s government mostly supported by Sudan. These include: the ELF (Eritrean Liberation Front), and the EPLF (Eritrean People Liberation Front). The Sudanese support to these armed groups was on-and-off. As young (2007: 17-18) said, 

 “Support from the Sudanese state usually followed a pattern: when relations between Khartoum and Addis Ababa were positive, or there was an effort to improve them, support would decline, only to be resumed when relations deteriorated or Khartoum wanted to send a message to its neighboring regime.” 

The Imperial government of Ethiopia, frustrated by the Sudanese action, started to support the rebel movement in South Sudan known as “Anya Nya”. This civil war which was also called the “First Civil War” in Sudanese history took place from 1955 to 1972.  

The 1972 Sudanese Peace Conference in Addis Ababa  

As the supporter of the South Sudan rebels Haile Selassie had the power to influence the rebels to negotiate with the Sudanese government. In 1972, he decided to invite both the rebels and the Sudanese government to Addis Ababa for negotiation and end the “first Civil war” in Sudan (Young 2007: 12). A peace conference between the Sudanese government of president Nimeri and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement in Addis Ababa was held from 16-17 February 1972. The Sudanese government delegation was led by vice-president and Minister for Southern Affairs, Abel Alier. The rebels of the South were led by Ezboni Mindiri (Hoile, May 2002: 31). The negotiation was successful and it ended the first civil war. From 1972 until the mid-1980s relations between Ethiopia and Sudan were generally good. Even, in 1975, Sudan unsuccessfully tried to mediate the conflict between the Eritrean rebels and the Ethiopian government. However, when the Sudanese peoples Liberation (SPLA) started the so-called “Second civil war” or “Anya Nya II” (1983-2005) and appeared to challenge the central government of Sudan the relations between Ethiopia and Sudan once again became very sour.  

The 1972 Ethiopia-Sudan Border Talk  

After hosting the successful mediation talks between the South Sudanese rebels and the Sudanese government Ethiopia started boundary demarcation negotiation with Sudan. According to Mburu (22 March 2003: 29), in 1972 the two countries exchanged notes concerning their boundary problems. However, “An exchange of notes between Ethiopia and Sudan failed to settle the question of the Baro salient or make arrangements to stop banditry and establish peaceful coexistence among the pastoral people.” The 1972 Ethiopia-Sudan talk,“ fell short of a viable long-term solution inasmuch as it did not redefine where the boundary should run over the Baro salient”(Mburu 22 March 2003: 31).  

5. CONCLUSION  

International boundaries that are clearly defined and well-managed are very important for good international relations, national and local security, efficient local administration and for using natural resources efficiently (Pratt 2006). According to ICG (4 April 2002: i-ii), 

“The failure to resolve border issues prevents neighbors from normalizing relations and dealing with pressing social and economic issues. Thus it is important that any territorial differences be resolved on a mutually acceptable basis in accordance with the standards of international law and practice.”  

As Bahru (2002: 111-113) noted, “The delimitation of the boundaries between Ethiopia and the surrounding colonies was dictated mainly by the colonial powers’ apprehension of the expansive potentialities of post-Adwa Ethiopia.” The first boundary that was delimited was between Ethiopia and the French Somaliland (Djibouti). It was delimited on 20 March 1897. In the same year, Ethiopia’s boundary with the British Somaliland was delimited. Then, in the treaty between Ethiopia and Italy on 10 July 1900, Eritrea was separated from Ethiopia. On 15 May 1902 Ethiopia signed a treaty with the British over its border with Sudan. This treaty was territorially advantageous to the British. This treaty gave Gambella to the British and guaranteed the British’s hydraulic interests at Lake Tana. In 1907, Ethiopia’s boundary with the British East Africa (Kenya) was delimited. In 1908, Ethiopia’s boundary with the Italian Somaliland was delimited (Bahru 2002: 113). According to Bahru (2002: 114), all the boundary delimitations which Ethiopia made with the colonialists who used to rule Ethiopia’s neighbors had the following problems:  

 “Firstly, delimitation on the map was not always followed by demarcation on the ground. The long boundary with Sudan was only partially demarcated. The boundary with British Somaliland came to be demarcated only in the 1930s…..Secondly, the absence of effective administration in the frontiers regions made the boundary delimitation little more than a cartographical exercise. The Southern and South Western boundaries were constantly violated by trans-frontier raids and incursions. In a sense, this was the frontier peoples’ way of nullifying boundary agreements which were concluded without taking cognizance of their needs for seasonal movements of their flocks and for ethnic Unity.” 

In the past, particularly, during the reign of Haile Selassie I (1930-1974) Ethiopia as a dominant regional power in East Africa faced no serious challenges from the neighboring countries though Somalia and Sudan were occasionally creating border disputes. For instance, while Kenya was a British colony the British claimed an area called Gadaduma along the Ethio-Kenya border which was under Ethiopia’s administration. This border dispute was not settled when Kenya achieved independence in 1963. After initial hesitation, Kenya acknowledged Ethiopia’s ownership over Gadaduma in the 1970 negotiation. Kenya decided to accept Ethiopia’s ownership over the disputed land because it wanted good relation with the then strong Ethiopia which was ruled by world class statesman, Emperor Haile Selassie, rather than provoking and picking up a fight (Nordquist 2002). This is because, as Nordquist (2002:10) said, sometimes “the need for good relations with a neighbor outweighed particular claims of one of the parties.” According to Nordquist (2002: 10),  

“For Kenya it was more important to obtain a positive security relationship with Ethiopia, against Somalia, than to change certain aspects of the boundary. The changing conflict system for Kenya, going from British rule to independence, which made security concerns prominent for the then newly independent state, caused a shift in priorities vis-à-vis Ethiopia, which had not undergone a similar change of international status.” 

On the other hand, Somalia, which had a border conflict with Ethiopia, followed a different approach to solve its border problem: confrontation. Particularly, after the coming to political power of Said Barre in 1969 the direct confrontation with Ethiopia in the final analysis led to the collapse of Somalia as a nation in 1989 (Nordquist 2002: 22).  

In the last few months particularly, in May-June 2008 the disclosure of the ongoing “secret” negotiations between Ethiopian government officials and the Sudanese government has created uproar in Ethiopia (Deutsche Welle 08-05-2008; VOA 05 June 2008)35. Many Ethiopian opposition groups and Ethiopian Diasporas have condemned this secret deal in which, according to the media reports36, the Ethiopian government has agreed to re-demarcate the Ethiopia-Sudan boundary and ceded many Ethiopian lands to Sudan. Whether these allegations are true or not, we will come to know in the near future when the dust settles. But, in principle boundary demarcation should be transparent and should be ratified according to the legal procedures of both countries. As border disputes are one of the major causes for conflicts among countries, recently the ICG (4 April 2002: iii) has proposed a number of principles that should be considered in any boundary demarcations. The major ones include: Unilateral border demarcations should be stopped; all demarcations should be transparent; official joint commissions should be established to facilitate demarcations; the local population should be consulted; visa requirements should be simplified to facilitate border crossing procedures; consulates should be opened in border cities; border guards should be trained in border and visa procedures; border guards should be trained to stop or discourage corruption among them and customs authorities, and to prevent harassment of travelers; map archives should be open; regional governors along the border should be granted a relative free hand to deal with the Social concerns of local populations in the disputed areas; NGOs should be allowed to engage in dispute mediation along the border; ethnic minorities in border area should be protected; and boundary should be ratified according to the country’s legal procedure. 

ENDNOTES  

(1) The Ethiopian emperor who initiated the re-unification process of the country. He ruled the country from 1855 to 1868 and died fighting against the British at Maqdalla in 1868. 

(2) OLF (Oromo Liberation Front); EPPF (Ethiopian Peoples Patriotic Front) 

(3) It was Stephen Jones who outlined the “traditional” four stages of boundary making in 1945. However, as Pratt (2006) noted the four stages (i.e.delimitation, demarcation, maintenance and management) should not be seen as totally independent processes. In many cases they overlap. 

(4) On the other hand, Prescott (1979) identifies only three stages in boundary making: allocation, delimitation and demarcation. 

(5) Ron Adler calls the politicians and their advisers as “boundary architects” and the technical specialists as “boundary engineers” (Blake 1995: 45).  

(6) As stated elsewhere in this paper, Charles Gwynn who delimited and demarcated Ethiopia’s border with Sudan was employed by the Royal Engineers Officers. 

(7) Blake (1995: 46) argues that “agreements are…….perfectly valid without demarcation.” 

(8) As Rushworth (1997:61) emphasized “delimitation” requires the arts of diplomacy, while “demarcation” is a mechanical process. In short, delimitation is drawing a line on the map while demarcation is drawing a line on the ground. 

(9) This is particularly true in poor countries like Ethiopia and Sudan.

(10) Loisel (2004: 4) argues that in 1990 almost 87% of African borders were inherited from colonial era. 

(11) Foucher (1991: 202) claimed that by 1991, 41% of African border had never been demarcated. 

(12) On the other hand, Asiwaju and Nugent (1993) criticized the perception that claims African ethnic conflicts are caused by irrational colonial boundaries. 

(13) This means, according to Griggs (1997: 64), after independence African countries agreed to stick with colonial boundaries which were the result of the 1884 Berlin Conference. Herbst (1989: 673) argues: “there is widespread agreement that the boundaries are arbitrary, yet the vast majority of them have remained virtually untouched since the late 1800’s, when they were first demarcated.” The only two exceptions are Eritrea and the Western Sahara. 

(14) Griggs (1997: 66) argues that African colonial boundaries are also the causes for high economic costs. That is to say, due to border disputes African countries purchase armaments and sometimes the expense is equivalent to the foreign aid they are receiving. 

(15) E.g., the relation between the ancient Axumite Kingdom of Ethiopia and the Meroe Kingdom of Sudan. 

(16) Egypt annexed Sudan in 1821-1822. 

(17) Named after their leader Muhammad Ahmad (“Mahdi”) who later ruled Sudan from June 1881 to June 1885 by expelling the Anglo-Egyptian forces. 

(18) The Mahdists successfully expelled the Egyptians from Sudan and occupied Khartoum in 1885. 

(19) Khalifa Abdallah succeeded Mahdi and ruled Sudan from June 1885 to September 1898. 

(20) According to Abdussamad (1999), “Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Ethiopian empire incorporated the north western border enclaves of Bela-Shangul and Gumuz into greater Ethiopia.” 

(21) Major Charles Gwynn (Later Major General) was born in Ireland in 1870. In 1889, he was commissioned in the Royal Engineers. He joined the geographical section of the Intelligence Branch of the war office from 1897 to 1901. Until 1904 he undertook survey work in the Sudan. He was awarded his CMG for conducting the survey determining the border between Ethiopia and Sudan He died in 1963 in Dublin, Ireland (Long 1983). 

(22) Gwynn uses the terms “Abyssinia” and “Abyssinians” throughout his article. 

(23) This is because either the Europeans were not affordable or the Ethiopians were not ready to trust them (Gwynn 1937: 150). 

(24) The forces of Khalifa were able to push the British forces towards Gedaref and Gallabat provinces and Blue Nile and Sobat rivers (Gwynn 1937: 151) 

(25) Named after the head of the delegation, James Rennell Rodd. 

(26) By that time, the British themselves had no clear information about the Ethiopia-Sudan border areas. According to Gwynn (1937: 150-151), “to take the case of the Sudan; the maps in much of the frontier regions were blank, and other parts were out of date-nor could the Abyssinians supply reliable information”. 

(27) As I stated earlier, the Dervishes defeated the Anglo-Egyptian forces in 1885 and drove them from cities like Khartoum. However, in July 1894, the Italians under General Baratieri expanded their holding from Massawa and conquered Kassala from the Dervishes. When the Italians were defeated by Menelik of Ethiopia in 1896 at Adwa, they were not in a position to maintain their forces in Kassala though the post Adwa peace agreement between Ethiopia and Italy allow the latter to keep its military presence in the Kassala area (The New York Times 21 December 1897). In the mean time, the Dervishes besieged the Italian forces at Kassala in March 1896. Unable to resist the pressure, the Italians decided to evacuate from Kassala, and the Anglo-Ethiopian forces rapidly occupied Kassala. The British used Kassala as a launching pad to counter-attack the Dervishes who fortified themselves in Khartoum (The New York Times 21 December 1897). 

(28) Captain Bright had previously conducted an expedition from East Africa to the northern end of Lake Rudolf 

(29) Elaboration is mine 

(30) In the following years, some of the communities resisted the British’s attempt to put them in Sudan. One of the leaders of the resistance was Ibrahim Wad Mahmud. Then, the British sent an army to crush the resistance and hanged Ibrahim Wad Mahmud in Khartoum (See Gwynn 1937: 154). (31) As testified by Mburu (2003:20) “Addis Ababa renounced Britain’s attempt to rectify this border through a survey by Major Charles Gwynn (Royal Engineers) in August 1908 for excluding Ethiopian surveyors.”  

(32) The preliminary survey of the Kenya-Ethiopia boundary was earlier carried out by Captain P. Maud R.E., in the winter of 1902-1903. He surveyed the area between the Dawa River and Lake Rudolf (Gwynn 1937: 159). 

(33) Emperor Menelik’s illness was a great concern for the British as clearly seen in the British newspapers. The New York Times reported the health condition of the Emperor on almost regular basis (See: New York Times 9 January 1992; 30 January 1909; 2 November 1909; 1 December 1906; 23 December 1906; 25 May 1910; 22 February 1910; 29 March 1910; 31 October 1909; 12 January 1910; 2 April 1910; 19 December 1909). 

(34) One of the causes for the conflict between Ethiopia and Sudan was a boundary problem. In order to properly study his country’s boundary problem with Sudan Haile Selassie established two inquiry committees at different times.  

(35) VOA (05 June 2008) reported that, “The news of a boundary settlement shocked many Ethiopians, who consider the ceded Ethiopian land to be historically and culturally theirs.” 

(36) As reported by Arabic News.com (7-3-2003), Ethiopia (under the direct order of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi) agreed to return the lands in al-Fashqa area to the east of “Sundus” and Atbarawi River, except small pockets of lands which were not settled yet. According to the claim of Abdul Rahman al-Khuder, the Wali (“governor”) of al-Qadaref province, after a series of negotiations “direct directions were issued by the Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi to end the conflict which lasted for 7 years and the return of the lands to its Sudanese owners.” In the border negotiations, according to Abdelrahman al-Khidir Sudan has got 17 Sudanese villages from Ethiopia which were the “Source of dispute for more than 100 years” between Sudan and Ethiopia (Sudan Tribune 4 July 2007). 

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Author: Dr. Wondwosen TESHOME, B. University of Vienna, Department of Anthropology, Austria, wonteslm007@gmail.com

A quarter-century after a million Ethiopians died in the great hunger of 1984-85, the country is heading into another famine. The spring rains failed entirely and the summer rains were three weeks late. But why is famine is stalking Ethiopia again?

The Ethiopian government is authoritarian, but it isn’t incompetent. It gives fertilizer to farmers and teaches best practices. By the late 1990s the country was self-sufficient in food in good years, and the government had created a strategic food reserve for the bad years. So why are we back here again?

Infant deaths are already over two per 10,000 per day in Somali, the worst-hit region of Ethiopia. (Four per day counts as full-scale famine.) Country-wide, 20 percent of the population already depends on the dwindling flow of foreign food aid, and it will get worse for many months yet. What have the Ethiopians done wrong?

The real answer is they have had too many babies. Ethiopia’s population at the time of the last famine 25 years ago was 40 million. Now it is 80 million. You can do everything else right and if you don’t control the population, you’re spitting into the wind.

It is so obvious that this should be the start of every conversation about the country. Even if the coming famine in Ethiopia kills a million people, the population will keep growing. So the next famine, 10 or 15 years from now, will hit a country of a hundred million people, trying to make a living from farming on land where only 40 million faced starvation in the 1980s. It is going to get much uglier in Ethiopia.

Yet it’s taboo to say that. The question of population, instead of being central to the debate about development, food and climate change, has been put on ice. The reason is rich countries are secretly embarrassed, and poor countries are deeply resentful.

Suppose Ethiopia had been the first country to industrialize. Suppose some mechanical genius in Tigray invented the world’s first steam engine in 1710. The first railways were spreading across the country by the 1830s, and at the same time Ethiopian entrepreneurs and imperialists spread all over Africa. By the end of the 19th century, they controlled half of Europe, too.

Never mind the improbabilities. The point is Ethiopia with such a history would easily be rich enough to support 80 million people now — if it could not grow enough food it would import it, just like Britain (where the industrial revolution actually started). Money makes everything easy.

In 1710, when the first practical steam engine was built in Devonshire, the population of Britain was 7 million. It is now 61 million, but they do not fear famine. They eat very well despite importing over a third of their food. They got in first, so although they never worried about population growth, they got away with it.

Ethiopia has more than four times the land surface of Britain. The rain is less reliable, but a rich Ethiopia would have no trouble feeding its people. The problem is that it got the population growth without the wealth. Stopping the population growth now would be very hard, but otherwise, famine will be a permanent resident in another 20 years.

The problem is well understood. The population of the rich countries has grown about tenfold since the earliest days of the industrial revolution, but for the first half of that period it grew quite slowly. Many babies died and there were no cures for most epidemic diseases. Later the death rate dropped, but by then, with people feeling more secure in their lives, the birth rate was dropping, too.

In most of the poor countries the population hardly grew at all until the start of the 20th century. But once the population did start to grow, thanks to basic public health measures that cut the death rate, it grew faster than it ever did in the rich countries. Unfortunately, economies don’t grow that fast, so these countries never achieved the level of comfort and security where most people will start to reduce their family size spontaneously. At the current rate of growth, Ethiopia’s population will double to 160 million people in just 32 years.

You’re thinking: That will never happen. Famine will become normal in Ethiopia well before that. No combination of wise domestic policies, and no amount of foreign aid, can stop it. And you are right.

What applies to Ethiopia applies to many other African countries, including some that do not currently have famines. Uganda, for example, had 5 million people in 1960. It now has 32 million, and at the current growth rate it will have 130 million by 2050.

History is unfair. Conversations between those who got lucky and those left holding the other end of the stick are awkward. But we cannot go on ignoring the elephant in the room. We have to start talking about population again.

“ONI unearthed evidence of systematic blocking of Internet content in only one country, Ethiopia, though one could imagine other countries in the region doing the same”, the report states.

Opponents of the current political regime have increasingly used online media to criticize the government particularly in the aftermath of the highly contested elections in 2005.

The response of the regime was to implement a nationwide Internet filtering plan blocking access to popular blogs and community web sites (including CyberEthiopia), many news organizations, dissident political parties, and human rights groups. Many sites including millions of blogs created with Google’s Blogger.com are inaccessible from Ethiopia since May 2006 (read Google blocked in Ethiopia).

As reported in our article “Are websites unblocked in Ethiopia?”,there were few indications that web sites and blogs were unblocked in March 2009, yet our sources in Ethiopia had only confirmed an erratic access to CyberEthiopia and other ethiopian news sites. The apparent lifting at the time of the Internet filtering came few days after President Obama’s administration released its Human Rights reports in 2009 accusing the Ethiopian government of restricting Internet access to its citizens and of “blocking web sites”

Many sources as well as documented evidence of the Opennet Initiative confirm a systematic, nationwide and politically motivated Internet censorship and surveillance in Ethiopia. By analogy to the Chinese Internet censorship, the banning is not just limited to blocking specific web sites and their IP addresses. It also filters keywords and ideas that go through the state run firewalls. For example, the keyword “cyberethiopia” like many other words is on the blacklist, therefore users in Ethiopia are not only restricted from accessing the web site, but they can not even include a link (web address) to it nor mention it in an ordinary email from Yahoo or Gmail. Keyword filtering makes also the use of proxy servers (or “mirror” web sites) difficult to circumvent cybercensorship. The Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation uses several techniques to disguise the political filtering practices by attempting to confuse users with different error messages.

Despite numerous calls from Global Media watchdog, government officials always denied restricting access to the Internet saying that they had no explanation or information about the inaccessibility of these web sites.

It is to be recalled that all Internet users in Ethiopia access the World Wide Web through the Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation (ETC), a state monopoly and sole Internet Service Provider (ISP) in the country. Despite repeated media announcements by the government about huge infrastructure investment in Information Communication Technology (ICT) and expanding services, Ethiopia remains at the bottom of the table in Africa in ICT including Internet penetration. According to the International Telecommunication Union’s report,, it has the lowest mobile phone density in Africa (measured as number of subscribers per 100 inhabitants), only 0.45 Internet users per 100 inhabitants and widespread political internet filtering (ONI).

One few ways to accesses blocked websites in Ethiopia. EthioSun does not advise to use WEYANE owned or controlled computers to accesses blocked blogs or websites.

Click here to view the embedded video.

As he drives around New York City area, literally thousands of people see the picture of Ethiopian dictator, Meles Zenawi, and Sudanese dictator, Omar al-Bashir, separated only by the skulls of human beings.

With only three weeks left before the March to Stop Genocide and Dictatorship in Ethiopia/Africa, we want to remind people to clear their schedules and to make arrangements to come. Let your consciences stir you to put everything else aside for this one afternoon where the millions of silenced voices of those living under African dictators can finally be heard in a huge resounding shout saying, “We have had ENOUGH!” The march, scheduled to take place on September 13, 2009, in front of the US Capitol building in Washington D.C., is an opportunity to be the voice for suppressed Ethiopians and Africans who are saying, “We have had enough death, misery, suffering, tyranny and man made poverty at the hands of dictators. We are ready for freedom, justice, human rights, peace and opportunity!”

Will you be part of this outpouring of support for our fellow human beings in Africa who are being crushed by a handful of abusive, corrupt and power-hungry individuals who have little or no conscience or regard for their fellow humans? Almost every great social change throughout history has resulted because people of moral convictions and compassion towards others, have stepped out of their comfortable lives to advocate for others. Will you be one of them? In the last few weeks before the march, there is still much left to be done to get the word out and we need your help in doing it. One Ethiopian taxi cab driver has attached the March banner on top of his taxi.

The country’s Bob Marley can return to what he does best, at a price

IT WAS a euphoric week for younger Ethiopians. The country’s great long-distance runner, Kenenisa Bekele, ran down an Eritrean rival to win gold in the world athletics championships. Even better, the country’s most popular singer, Teddy Afro, was released from prison.

Ethiopia’s , Meles Zenawi, says there are no political prisoners in his country. Human-rights activists and diplomats say there are thousands—and a lot of Ethiopians believe Mr Afro was one of them.

Mr Afro was jailed for a hit-and-run incident in 2006, despite always insisting that he was not in the car which the prosecution said knocked down and killed a homeless man in Addis Ababa. He served 16 months of a two-year sentence, which had already been reduced on appeal from six years on grounds of shaky evidence. His supporters, though, allege that his jailing had more to do with his third album, “Yasteseryal”, released just before the country’s last election in 2005. A lusty patriot who often sings, with funk and reggae influences, in praise of Ethiopia’s deposed emperor, Haile Selassie, Mr Afro got into trouble for songs which compared Mr Meles’s lot to a brutal junta.

The decision to release him was probably pragmatic. The government knows that it will have to win over unhappy young voters—Mr Afro’s fans—if it is to win next year’s general election convincingly. Officially, the singer’s release was for good behaviour. But it was probably also conditional on his avoiding political songs in the run up to the election. Mr Afro seems to be playing along, at least so far. He told the state media that he had a “nice” time in prison.

The worry for the government is that the release of Mr Afro will now throw the spotlight back on its jailing of Birtukan Mideksa, a charismatic young opposition leader, judge and single mother. Ms Mideksa had already spent 18 months behind bars before she was jailed again earlier this year for denying that she had asked for a pardon. Her supporters say she has had to spend much of the year in solitary confinement.

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